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Some of Them Still Don't Get It: Hostile
Work Environment Litigation in the
Lower Courts
Eric Schnappert
[A] grunting sound that sounded like "urn um urn."
Noises deemed insufficiently offensive to
support a sexual harassment claim in the
Seventh Circuit.1
[G]utteral noises ... a purring or growling noise made in
the throat.
Noises deemed sufficiently offensive to
support a sexual harassment claim in the
Eighth Circuit.2
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson,3 the Supreme Court
established the basic rationale and standards for what was then a
relatively new type of employment discrimination claim - sexual
harassment. The defendant in Meritor did not deny that sexual
harassment drew a distinction based on gender; to the contrary,
it evidently acknowledged that "when a supervisor sexually har-
asses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that super-
t Pendleton Miller Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. B.A.
1962, M.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; B.Phil. 1965, Oxford University; LL.B. 1968,
Yale Law School.
Baskerville v Culligan International Co, 50 F3d 428, 430 (7th Cir 1995).
2 Hathaway v Runyon, 132 F3d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir 1997); id at 1222 ("[tlhe jury
heard Hathaway reproduce the noises that disturbed her, and it credited her position that
this pattern of behavior created a hostile work environment"); see also Mendoza v Borden,
Inc, 158 F3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir 1998) ("a sniffing sound"); Williamson v City of Houston,
148 F3d 462, 463 (5th Cir 1998) ("whistling and purring at [victim]"); Kimzey v Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc, 107 F3d 568, 570 (8th Cir 1997) (harasser "smacked his lips and made kissing
noises").
' 477 US 57 (1986).
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visor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."4 Instead, the employer
argued that such discrimination is only illegal when it brings
about a very severe and undoubtedly uncommon type of harm,
causing "'tangible loss' of 'an economic character.'"5 The Supreme
Court unanimously rejected this argument. Title VII, the Court
said, "strike[s] at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women."' Meritor announced the now widely cited for-
mulation that the defendant will be liable for harassment that is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.'"7
In 1993, seven years after Meritor, the Court faced a nar-
rower question in Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc' - whether psy-
chological harm was a prerequisite to a cause of action for a hos-
tile work environment.' In Harris the lower court had dismissed a
hostile work environment claim because the harassment had not
caused a specific type of serious injury, harm "so severe as to be
expected to seriously affect [Harris'] psychological well-being.""0
In dismissing the case, the district court was following the Sixth
Circuit decision in Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co." The Rabidue
rule limited sexual harassment claims - the very claims de-
clared actionable by Meritor - to cases where the harassment
had caused (or nearly caused) a nervous breakdown. 2 The
Rabidue restriction was clearly inconsistent with Meritor's insis-
tence that Title VII reaches "the entire spectrum" of discrimina-
tory treatment. Apparently this inconsistency was obvious to the
Supreme Court: it decided Harris a mere twenty-seven days after
hearing oral argument." Even Justice Scalia believed that Harris
largely resolved any major remaining questions about the legal
elements of a hostile work environment case. He suggested that
Id at 64 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id (internal quotations and citations omitted), quoting Los Angeles Dept of Water
and Power v Manhart, 435 US 702, 707 n 13 (1978).
' 477 US at 67, quoting Henson v Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 904 (11th Cir 1982) (altera-
tion in original). This article does not deal with the somewhat distinct issues raised by
quid pro quo harassment.
510 US 17 (1993).
Id at 22 (holding that psychological harm is not required to prevail on a hostile
work environment claim).
Id at 20.
805 F2d 611 (6th Cir 1986).
Id at 620 (requiring that actionable harassment "affect seriously the psychological
well-being of [a] reasonable person under like circumstances").
" Harris was argued on October 13, 1993, and decided on November 9, 1993. 510 US
at 17.
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the language of the majority opinion would leave "virtually un-
guided juries [to] decide whether sex-related conduct ... is egre-
gious enough to warrant an award of damages."" Justice Scalia
disavowed the imposition of any additional legal standards that
would further restrict jury evaluation of hostile environment
cases, frankly stating, "I know of no alternative to the course the
Court today has taken."15
Yet there were signs at the time of Harris that the underly-
ing issues would not be easily resolved. First, the rule in Rabidue,
which by the date of Harris had been adopted by several other
circuits, 8 obviously would have significantly undermined the
Court's earlier unanimous decision in Meritor. Sexual harass-
ment that leads to severe psychological injury - the only non-
economic hostile environment cases permitted by Rabidue - will
probably be rare, if only because most victims would resign before
such serious, and likely irreparable, harm had occurred. The
courts of appeals do not ordinarily adopt legal standards which,
as a practical matter, would foreseeably eviscerate a recent and
controlling Supreme Court precedent.
Second, despite the fact that the Rabidue rule would have
been a boon to employers (since it would have largely ended sex-
ual harassment litigation outside of the quid pro quo context), the
defendant in Harris flatly refused to defend Rabidue's "serious
psychological injury" rule.17 None of the business groups which
filed amicus briefs in support of Harris were willing to urge adop-
tion of the Rabidue standard. 8 This surprising reticence to en-
dorse a favorable precedent undoubtedly reflected their judgment
that the Sixth Circuit's Rabidue standard was so extreme that no
member of the Supreme Court - well populated though it was
with conservatives - was likely to endorse it.
Harris might have ended further controversy in the lower
courts if the serious psychological injury rule in Rabidue"9 had
simply been based on some misreading of a term in Title VII, or
of a passage in Meritor, or if the doctrine had been derived from
some ill-fashioned turn of phrase in a lower court opinion. But
" Id at 24 (Scalia concurring).
Id.
See id at 20.
17 The employer "conced[ed] that a requirement that the conduct seriously affect
psychological well-being is unfounded." 510 US at 23.
" Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of
Respondent, No 92-1168. The EEAC filed this brief on behalf of its 270 corporate mem-
bers. Id at 2.
" See 805 F2d at 620.
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the district court and court of appeals decisions in Rabidue had
adopted that standard as a method of implementing a clearly ar-
ticulated and quite sweeping attack on the whole idea of sexual
harassment." The Rabidue trial judge, Stewart Newblatt, wrote
an impassioned decision advancing views that even counsel for
the defendant had not advocated.2 The Sixth Circuit judges, Rob-
ert Krupansky and H. Ted Milburn, endorsed and elaborated on
Judge Newblatt's theories of the standard of legality for sexual
harassment. But in Harris, no party or amicus thought it prudent
to advance in the Supreme Court the theories articulated by
Newblatt, Krupansky, and Milburn. Therefore, when deciding
Harris, the Supreme Court never had occasion to consider the
strikingly indulgent attitude toward sexual harassment that un-
derlay the Rabidue rule. Although the Rabidue doctrines, dis-
cussed below,22 largely disappeared for a year after Harris, they
reemerged in the 1995 Seventh Circuit decision Baskerville v Cul-
ligan International Co,23 and then quickly spread to other cir-
cuits.24
Judges Newblatt, Krupansky and Milburn were intent on
limiting Title VII to a small group of sexual harassment cases,
and they saw the "serious psychological injury" rule as only one of
several methods for achieving that restriction.25 The district court
and court of appeals decisions in Rabidue provided a full arsenal
for bringing about that end. Any one of these methods - such as
requirements that the alleged harassment unreasonably interfere
with the victim's work performance, that the victim actually be
offended, and that she suffer injury resulting from the hostile
work environment2" - would likely be enough to assure that most
sexual harassment complaints would be dismissed as legally in-
sufficient. In combination, these requirements threatened to bar
nearly all sexual harassment claims. Although Harris disposed of
the serious psychological injury rule, the remaining legal theories
See Part I.
2 Interview with Barbara A. Klimaszewski, counsel for plaintiff (March 1999). [Edi-
tor's Note: The University of Chicago Legal Forum does not verify personal interviews.]
See text accompanying notes 36-41.
50 F3d 428 (7th Cir 1995). The court in Baskerville expressly relied on the earlier
decision in Rabidue, 50 F3d at 431. But see text accompanying notes 347-52.
24 See text accompanying note 356.
' The most direct account given by the court in Rabidue of the rationale for this
requirement was that it was needed "[t]o accord appropriate protections to both plaintiffs
and defendants in a hostile and/or abusive work environment sexual harassment case."
805 F2d at 620.
See id.
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endorsed by the Rabidue judges have persisted and grown in
scope and complexity in the years since Harris.
The circumstances in Harris illustrate the magnitude of the
problem that has emerged in the lower courts since 1993. The
perpetrator in Harris had never touched the plaintiff, seriously
propositioned her, or used vulgar language. Instead, the plaintiff
complained that he had made off-color jokes, innuendos about the
plaintiffs actions, and gender-related but non-sexual insults.2 7
The Supreme Court noted that the district court had conducted a
trial on the merits and had characterized the facts as presenting
a "close case," even under the stringent Rabidue standards. 2' The
Court remanded the case so that the lower court could apply the
correct legal standards.29 On remand, the district court concluded
that the defendant was operating a hostile environment and that
the conditions were so severe that the defendant had construc-
tively discharged the plaintiff."0 Under the Rabidue-like stan-
dards that are now applied by four or five circuits, however, a
complaint alleging facts identical to those in Harris would be
dismissed before trial as legally insufficient.
This Article describes how the courts of appeals have decided
sexual harassment cases in the five years since Harris. In some
circuits, events have unfolded largely as Justice Scalia antici-
pated: the trier of fact - ordinarily a jury - applies the hostile
work environment standard announced in Meritor and elaborated
upon in Harris.31
In stark contrast, four circuits continue to rely on the same
rationales underlying the Sixth Circuit's decision in Rabidue.
These courts have responded to Meritor and Harris with an array
510 US at 19.
Id at 23 ("the [district] court found this to be a 'close case').
' Id. Only a month after Harris, a Fourth Circuit panel including retired Justice
Powell issued a per curiam decision which described the facts in Harris as illustrating
what the Supreme Court believed "would make out a hostile working environment claim
under Title VII." Shope v Board of Supervisors of Loudon County, 1993 US App LEXIS
33058, *6 (4th Cir) (unpublished disposition). The decision upheld a jury's finding in favor
of the plaintiff. The record in Shope involved neither off-color remarks nor requests for
sexual propositions, but was limited to disparaging remarks about women. Id at *4 (plain-
tiff admonished not to be "such a soft woman," warned that she was "too aggressive a
woman," called a "stupid woman" and a "weak woman"). Under subsequent Fourth Circuit
decisions, this case, that upheld a $650,000 compensatory award, would now be dismissed
as legally insufficient.
Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 66 FEP Cases (BNA) 1886 (M D Tenn 1994).
, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which for the first time authorized awards of com-
pensatory damages, conferred on the parties to such a case a statutory right to a trial by
jury. Pub L No 102-66, 105 Stat 1072 (1991), codified at 42 USC § 1981a (1994). Virtually
all sexual harassment plaintiffs seek compensatory damages and ask for jury trials.
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of exceptions to and loopholes in the prohibitions announced in
those cases. Thus, harassment patterns and tactics that are
clearly unlawful in much of the country are practically immune
from attack in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. Be-
cause of the composition of the federal judiciary in those four cir-
cuits - where deciding whether a work environment is hostile is
largely treated as a matter of law rather than a question of fact
- it is a virtual certainty that mostly men, usually only men,32
will determine whether a particular pattern of harassment cre-
ated a hostile work environment for women.
Part I of this Article describes the attitudes toward sexual
harassment underlying the decision in Rabidue and its progeny,
and explains how several circuits have continued and embel-
lished those attitudes since Harris. Part II describes the dramati-
cally different approaches that the circuit courts have taken to-
ward the roles of judges and juries in hostile work environment
cases. Part III considers the issues raised by harassment of
women that is not sexual in nature. Part IV analyzes the problem
of determining what types of harassing actions can be treated as
an element of a hostile work environment claim. Part V sets forth
the difficulties the lower courts have had applying Meritor's "se-
vere or pervasive" formula. Part VI considers what type of "envi-
ronment" is unlawful under Meritor and Harris. Part VII dis-
cusses the interrelated arguments that women "accept" sexual
harassment and that the law should tolerate harassment in cer-
tain occupations. Although the analysis focuses largely on sexual
and other gender-based harassment, many of the same or similar
issues arise in cases of racial or national origin harassment.
I. THE WORLD ACCORDING TO RABIDUE
The Rabidue opinions were avowedly based, not on the text
or legislative history of Title VII, but on the authors' well-
articulated ideas about the sensitivities of reasonable women and
the culpability of alleged harassers. Modern women, they ex-
plained, really do not care if male workers use abusive or sexually
explicit language or treat them as sexual objects; women accept
that as just a normal part of life in the late twentieth century.
Two of the 17 judges on the Seventh Circuit are women, although Judge Ann C.
Williams of the Northern District of Illinois was recently confirmed as a judge on the
Seventh Circuit. See 145 Cong Rec S 14587 (Nov 10, 1999). Currently, the probability in
this Circuit that a sexual harassment case will be decided by a panel in which women are
the majority is only 2.2 percent. By contrast, in 67 percent of cases, only male judges will
sit on a panel deciding these legal issues.
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Any woman who still objects to such things is simply a Victorian
prude. Men who do these things just cannot help themselves; it is
simply a part of innocent human nature for many adult males to
act this way. Post-Harris opinions continue to be strewn with
such explanations, reminiscent of the era when some construction
workers pretended to one another that they were showering wel-
come compliments on the passing women at whom they shouted
sexually-explicit remarks.
A. Modern Women Don't Mind That Much
In Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 3 the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a sexual harassment plaintiff had to show that
she had sustained psychological injury.34 But the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co 5 had also contained a
second, related requirement: that the plaintiff must also prove
that a "reasonable" person would have sustained such an injury."6
In a 1991 Seventh Circuit decision endorsing Rabidue, Judge
Cummings justified this additional rule as "a check on claims for
relief by the supersensitive 'eggshell' plaintiff."37 In the Fourth
Circuit Judge Murnaghan argued that this rule was essential
"because '[a]n employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to his
[or her] working environment.' 38 In Rabidue, District Court
Judge Newblatt downplayed the harasser's language as "annoy-
ing, but not so shocking or severe as to actually affect the psyches
of female employees."39 Judge Newblatt further explained that
the language "merely constituted an annoying - but fairly insig-
nificant - part of the total job environment." ° On appeal in
Rabidue, Circuit Judge Krupansky also dismissed the harasser's
actions as only "annoying" but "not so startling as to have af-
fected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or other female em-
ployees.""
" 510 US 17 (1993).
Id at 20.
805 F2d 611 (6th Cir 1985).
Id at 620 (requiring plaintiff to prove that "defendant's conduct would have inter-
fered with a reasonable individual's work performance").
Daniels v Essex Group, Inc, 937 F2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir 1991).
Paroline v Unisys Corp, 879 F2d 100, 105 (4th Cir 1989) (alterations in original),
vacated on other grounds, 900 F2d 27 (1990), quoting Bristow v Daily Press, Inc, 770 F2d
1251, 1255 (4th Cir 1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co, 584 F Supp 419, 432 (E D Mich 1984).
Id at 433.
4 805 F2d at 622.
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The judges' comments are significant in two distinct but in-
terrelated ways. First, the view expressed by Newblatt and Kru-
pansky - that the conduct was annoying, but not unlawful -
may have reflected their belief that the actions complained of in
Rabidue were mere peccadillos, barely more than harmless. "An-
noying" is the sort of adjective an employee might use to describe
a co-worker who was occasionally curt or boastful. In fact, the
harasser in Rabidue regularly made comments about the female
employees, including the plaintiff, which Judge Newblatt classi-
fied as "obscene," including routinely referring to those women as
"whores," "cunt," "pussy" and "tits."42 It is difficult to believe that
Newblatt or Krupansky would have used the word "annoyed" to
describe an African-American worker who was called a "nigger."
The judges' willingness to trivialize an epithet such as "cunt"3
reflects either a profound unfamiliarity with the actual views and
sensitivities of women, or an overarching predisposition to believe
either that women simply do not mind sexual remarks very
much, or that they regard them as complimentary.
Second, the insistence that the serious psychological injury
rule is necessary to preclude claims by "oversensitive" women
makes no sense unless a judge holds a fairly specific and unusual
view about the difference between reasonable and "oversensitive"
women. To many readers the argument might seem unintelligi-
ble, because we can readily imagine conduct that reasonable
women would find utterly obnoxious but which would not lead
them to the verge of a nervous breakdown. Justice O'Connor ex-
plained in Harris that "[s]o long as the environment would rea-
sonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive,
there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious."' The
argument made by Newblatt and Krupansky would make sense,
however, if one assumes that a reasonable woman would never
find that sexual harassment had created a hostile or abusive en-
vironment until the harassment had reached the very point at
which it indeed caused serious psychological injury. On that
premise, only "oversensitive" women would regard as abusive or
hostile an environment which failed to meet the extraordinarily
stringent Rabidue standard.
42 Id at 624 (Keith dissenting) (noting that one supervisor specifically remarked of
plaintiff that, "All that bitch needs is a good lay.").
' Judge Krupansky's indulgent attitude tdward this language is exemplified by a
passage euphemistically referring to the supervisor's language as "off-color." Id at 622
n 7.
. 510 US at 22 (citation omitted).
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The pre-Harris decisions rejecting Rabidue expressly dis-
agreed with that opinion's assumptions about women. Referring
specifically to the facts of Rabidue, the Third Circuit in Andrews
v City of Philadelphia,45 explained that:
Obscene language and pornography quite possibly could
be regarded as "highly offensive to a woman who seeks to
deal with her fellow employees and clients with profes-
sional dignity and without the barrier of sexual differen-
tiation and abuse." Although men may find these actions
harmless and innocent, it is highly possible that women
may feel otherwise."
The Ninth Circuit decision disapproving of the Rabidue rule indi-
cated agreement with the contrary view that "[c]onduct that
many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women. " "
This seems a fair characterization of the reasoning behind the
Rabidue opinions.
Even after Harris, some lower courts remain preoccupied
with concerns about oversensitive women filing harassment
claims. Decisions in the Fifth4" and Seventh49 Circuits conjure up
the specter of women of "Victorian" sensibilities objecting to ac-
tions or statements that assuredly would not bother truly modern
women. In Baskerville v Culligan International Co,5" the alleged
harasser had made a gesture "intended to suggest masturbation,"
"made a grunting sound that sounded like 'um um um'" when the
plaintiff walked by, commented that it got "hot" when she entered
895 F2d 1469 (3d Cir 1990).
Id at 1485-86 (citation omitted).
Ellison v Brady, 924 F2d 872, 879 (9th Cir 1991).
Weller v Citation Oil & Gas Corp, 84 F3d 191, 194 (5th Cir 1996); DeAngelis v El
Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn, 51 F3d 591, 593 (5th Cir 1995).
'" Gleason v Mesirow Financial Inc, 118 F3d 1134, 1146 (7th Cir 1997); Baskerville v
Culligan Intl Co, 50 F3d 428, 431 (7th Cir 1995). In some instances this attitude is re-
flected in comments that seem cavalierly dismissive of the asserted abuses. In Pickens v
Runyon, the court commented that "[m]any of [the plaintiff's] claims seem somewhat
hypersensitive, and other 'evidence' upon which she relies ... seems to us to be more like
poor taste rather than harassment." 128 F3d 1151, 1157 (7th Cir 1997). The incidents
complained of included the following: (1) the alleged harasser "put his arm around her,
professed his love for her, and told her that if she did not reciprocate he would kidnap her
and run away with her"; (2) the alleged harasser "cornered [plaintiff], grabbed her, hugged
her, and attempted to 'stick his tongue' in her mouth"; (3) the alleged harasser grabbed
the plaintiff and said, "Ms. Pickens, calm down before I am forced to kiss you"; (4) a differ-
ent alleged harasser "asked Pickens, 'Do you have any black in you?' She replied, 'No,
why?' He answered, 'Let me give you some'"; and (5) another harasser commented, "You
need a booty on your butt." Id at 1152-53.
7' 50 F3d 428 (7th Cir 1995).
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his office, and advised the plaintiff that one public address an-
nouncement really meant "[a]ll pretty girls run around naked."5
A jury concluded that the plaintiff had shown that her work envi-
ronment was hostile, and the district judge sustained that ver-
dict. A panel of the Seventh Circuit concluded that they had it all
wrong:
It is no doubt distasteful to a sensitive woman to have
such a silly man as one's boss, but only a woman of Victo-
rian delicacy - a woman mysteriously aloof from contem-
porary American popular culture in all its sex-saturated
vulgarity - would find Hall's patter substantially more
distressing than the heat and cigarette smoke of which the
plaintiff does not complain."
This passage does not purport to apply some legal standard to the
facts, or to suggest that the plaintiff, jury and trial judge had
misunderstood the meaning of Title VII. Rather, Judge Posner's
point is that a sensible, modern woman in Ms. Baskerville's posi-
tion would never have complained at all - not that Ms. Basker-
ville should not have brought suit, but that it was not reasonable
for her even to seriously object to the manner in which she was
being treated. Evidently no reasonable woman would find the
supervisor's conduct harmful, and so a plaintiff could not use Ti-
tle VII to make him stop. The women dismissed as overly sensi-
tive throwbacks to the nineteenth century presumably included
not only the plaintiff, but also any women on the jury, and the
district court judge, Judge Suzanne Conlon.
A year later, in Galloway v General Motors Service Parts Op-
erations,53 Judge Posner explained that in Baskerville:
[W]e created a safe harbor for employers in cases in which
the alleged harassing conduct is too tepid or intermittent
or equivocal to make a reasonable person believe that she
has been discriminated against on the basis of her sex.5
Judge Coffey reiterated this point in Gleason v Mesirow Finan-
cial, Inc.5" Several things about these opinions are noteworthy.
First, these cases did not involve women who mistake perfectly
SI Id at 430.
5 Id at 431.
78 F3d 1164 (7th Cir 1996).
Id at 1168.
118 F3d at 1144.
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innocent actions for something improper. To the contrary, the
safe harbor in Galloway is for "some sexual innuendo or gender
slur,"6 and in Gleason it is for "low-level harassment."57 Fur-
thermore, where the court discusses women who misapprehend
whether they have been "discriminated against" it is not referring
to women who unreasonably believe that their employers have
violated Title VII, but to women who are unreasonable in think-
ing there is anything really wrong with the way they are being
treated. Finally, a woman's misapprehension cannot be over
whether the perpetrator had treated the victim differently be-
cause she was a woman - disparate treatment is implicit in the
finding that a supervisor harassed the plaintiff or used a gender
slur. Gender-based distinctions were obviously present in all of
these cases. The boss in Baskerville did not make grunting
sounds at men or gleefully remark upon the idea of "buff boys"
running around naked. The spurned suitor who incessantly called
Ms. Galloway a "bitch" had not attempted to romance any male
co-workers. The supervisor in Gleason who made remarks about
the size of one female employee's breasts and urged another to
wear tighter skirts had not commented on the size of any male
workers' penises or told any men he liked them better in tight
pants. All three cases involved discrimination in the sense that
women were treated differently from men, and indeed treated
worse than men, because they were women.
The safe harbor doctrine seems intelligible only as an asser-
tion that no discrimination was present in the sense that some
gender-based distinctions are so harmless that no sensible person
would call them "discriminatory" - like having separate wash-
rooms or holding the door open for female co-workers. Thus Judge
Posner said of Galloway what Judge Coffey said of Gleason, that
she could not "rationally consider herself at a disadvantage in
relation to her male co-workers."58 This is a telling rhetorical
flourish that goes beyond what was necessary to decide the case.
If Galloway and Gleason were not at any disadvantage - if, in
fact, their employers treated them as well, or as poorly, as they
treated men - it would be irrelevant whether the plaintiffs be-
lieved otherwise, and it would be irrelevant whether their beliefs
were reasonable. The appeals courts that ruled against these
plaintiffs did not simply decide that they were not entitled to a
' 78 F3d at 1168.
17 118 F3d at 1144.
Galloway, 78 F3d at 1168; Gleason, 118 F3d at 1145.
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trial on the merits of their sexual harassment claims.59 The courts
went further, essentially deciding that the plaintiffs were irra-
tional, or at least silly, for having complained at all about the
treatment they had received because of their gender.
Two other lines of cases suggest a similar predisposition to
believe that sexual harassment is harmless, if not welcome. The
first line treats a woman's failure to complain about harassment
as conclusive evidence that she had no objection to the conduct.
In Hartsell v Duplex Products, Inc,'° the perpetrators warned the
plaintiff shortly after she was hired, "[w]e've made every female
in this office cry like a baby. We will do the same to you."6' Over
the three months that passed until the plaintiff quit, the harass-
ers insulted her in a variety of ways. They told her that she
"would become the slave," admonished her to "go home and fetch
your husband's slippers like a good little wife," and kicked and
pushed her chair.62 The Fourth Circuit explained that "because
Hartsell never complained to her husband or to the alleged har-
assers until [she resigned], she cannot prove 'that the harassment
was unwelcome."
Another line of cases holds that participation in "office banter"
can prove that the plaintiff welcomed the actions complained of;
thus the court of appeals concluded that Hartsell welcomed the
threat to reduce her to tears because she had later told "dumb
blond" jokes and boasted she "could drink [one of the alleged har-
assers] under the table anytime."' In Galloway, the district judge
insisted that the plaintiff "probably wasn't much upset" by the
perpetrator's continually referring to her as a "sick bitch," be-
cause she responded with "coarse remarks."65 However, Gallo-
way's retort to her harasser that he should "take that nasty dick
and stick it in [your] momma's mouth" cannot fairly be described
as a pleasantry indicating enjoyment of the conduct that pro-
voked it.'
In DeAngelis v El Paso Municipal Police Officers
Association,67 the Fifth Circuit followed a variant of the Rabidue
Both decisions upheld the granting of summary judgment for the employer.
123 F3d 766 (4th Cir 1997).
Id at 768 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 768-69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 774 n 7, quoting Wrightson v Pizza Hut of America, Inc, 99 F3d 138, 142 (4th
Cir 1996).
123 F2d at 769, 774 n 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"78 F3d at 1165.
Id (alteration in original).
51 F3d 591 (5th Cir 1995).
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argument that reasonable women only object to the most extreme
harassment. The DeAngelis court held that a sexual harassment
victim must show that the harassment interfered with her job
performance:
A hostile environment claim embodies conduct so egre-
gious as to ... destroy [the victim's] equal opportunity in
the workplace.... [A] less onerous standard of liability
would attempt to insulate women from everyday insults as
if they remained models of Victorian reticence .... [and]
would mandate not equality but preference for women....
[I]t seems perverse to claim that [American women] need
the protection of a preferential standard.'
Like the analogous section in the Rabidue opinion, this passage is
initially baffling - if women, but not men, are subject to daily
insults, but are nonetheless able to maintain their job perform-
ance, how can it be a "preference" for a court to end insults di-
rected only at those female workers? The argument only begins
to make sense if one assumes that any harassment which does
not interfere with job performance would necessarily be so
harmless that only an oversensitive woman would mind.
B. It Wouldn't Offend Madonna
The Rabidue opinion also advanced an even more provocative
argument, that a woman could not reasonably complain about a
workplace that was no more obscene than the signs in store win-
dows, or that was no more sexually explicit than American televi-
sion programs. On this ground, District Judge Newblatt dis-
missed the plaintiffs objection to the posting in company offices
of pictures of nude and half-naked women:
For better or worse, modern America features open dis-
plays of written and pictorial erotica. Shopping centers,
candy stores and prime time television regularly display
pictures of naked bodies and erotic real or simulated sex
acts. Living in this milieu, the average American should
not be legally offended by sexually explicit posters.69
Id at 593.
Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co, 584 F Supp 419, 433 (E D Mich 1984).
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Appeals Judge Krupansky insisted, on the same ground, that pic-
tures of naked women in a corporate headquarters could not
bother a reasonable woman, since she would already have been
inured to such lurid spectacles by the world in which she lived:
The sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis ef-
fect on the plaintiffs work environment when considered
in the context of a society that condones and publicly fea-
tures and commercially exploits open displays of written
and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time
television, at the cinema, and in other public places. In
sum, [the harasser's] vulgar language, coupled with the
sexually oriented posters, did not result in a working envi-
ronment that could be considered intimidating, hostile, or
offensive.7"
These contentions are even more astonishing in light of the
facts of each case. The posters that Judge Krupansky indulgently
characterized as "sexually oriented" were not lingerie advertise-
ments from the New York Times. One poster, which remained on
the wall for eight years, "showed a prone woman who had a golf
ball on her breasts with a man standing over her, golf club in
hand, yelling 'Fore.'"" The Rabidue argument reappeared in
Judge Posner's opinion in Baskerville.72 These cases suggest that
the paradigmatic "reasonable woman" with whom a plaintiff
should be compared is the brazen, bustier-clad strumpet that is
the stage persona of the pop star Madonna.
Judge Keith's dissenting opinion in Rabidue correctly ex-
plained that the practices invoked by the majority were no guide
to determining what women would regard as benign at the work-
place, since women found many of these practices to be offensive
in more public contexts too:
"Society" in [the majority's argument] must primarily refer
to the unenlightened; I hardly believe reasonable women
condone the pervasive degradation and exploitation of fe-
male sexuality perpetuated in American culture. In fact,
pervasive societal approval thereof.., stifles female po-
70 Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co, 805 F2d 611, 622 (6th Cir 1986) (emphasis added).
7 Id at 624 (Keith dissenting).
See text accompanying note 52.
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tential and instills the debased sense of self worth which
accompanies stigmatization.73
In fact it is not at all mysterious why many women who live
in a society with a sex-saturated culture might object to the con-
duct discussed in Baskerville, Galloway, or Gleason. Much of that
vulgarity is directed at appealing to men, many of whom (as pub-
lishers, broadcasters and advertisers well know) may enjoy a de-
gree of explicitness that is distasteful to most women. The fact
that Hustler and Playboy are sold to men and boys at thousands
of newsstands does not mean that women would regard with
equanimity an office plastered with pictures of naked women.
The fact that modern culture accepts the notion that women
would enjoy sex does not mean that they enjoy whatever unsolic-
ited sexual contact, slurs or smarmy remarks any supervisor or
co-worker might be inclined to inflict on them. Actions or words
that a woman might welcome from her spouse or lover might well
be entirely repugnant from anyone else, especially from a super-
visor who may be in a position to impose his whims on her. Even
in a sex-saturated culture, the difference between consent and
coercion is still the difference between romance and rape.
C. The Guys Didn't Mean Any Harm
Judge Krupansky in Rabidue also suggested that sexual har-
assment should be tolerated, or at least regarded as more toler-
able, when the perpetrators did not regard their conduct as wrong
or even unusual. "[A] proper assessment" of a sexual harassment
case, he insisted, required consideration of
the background and experience of the plaintiff, her co-
workers, and supervisors,... [and] the lexicon of obscenity
that pervaded the environment of the workplace both be-
fore and after the plaintiffs introduction into its envi-
rons .... Thus, the presence of actionable sexual harass-
ment would be different depending upon ... the prevailing
work environment.74
Judge Krupansky described as "aptly stated" Judge New-
blatt's explanation that many men just act this way and cannot
be expected to change:
805 F2d at 627 (Keith dissenting).
7 Id at 620.
292 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:
[I]t cannot seriously be disputed that in some work envi-
ronments, humor and language are rough hewn and vul-
gar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie maga-
zines may abound. Title VII was not meant to - or can -
change this.... Title VII is the federal court mainstay in
the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the fe-
male workers of America. But it is quite different to claim
that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers.75
These contentions are not limited to, or particularly about,
the era when garage mechanics put up wall calendars depicting
half naked women. Ms. Rabidue worked in an office where she
monitored government regulations, oversaw the extension of
credit to refineries that purchased petrochemicals from her em-
ployer, and dealt with corporate customers. The nude pictures
she complained about were not posted in a roustabout's locker,7"
but in the office work areas.77
This boys-will-be-boys attitude has, in the years since Harris,
inspired several distinct lines of cases. First, a number of deci-
sions insist that the touchstone of sexual harassment is not
whether women are treated in a disparate manner that they find
offensive, but whether the perpetrator harbored a predatory or
misogynistic motive. Thus the harassment in Galloway was
deemed non-discriminatory because it arose out of the perpetra-
tor's anger that the victim had resisted his advances, not out of
any belief "that women do not belong in the work force or are not
entitled to equal treatment with male employees."78 In Brill v
Lante Corp,79 the company president's dinner time description of
the breasts of a nearby female diner was dismissed as "mis-
guided. s° In Baskerville, Judge Posner explained that the perpe-
trator was not a "sexual harasser," but only "a man whose sense
of humor took final shape in adolescence." s" In Gross v Burggraf
Construction Co, 2 the plaintiff's supervisor stated to a male col-
Id at 620-21, quoting Rabidue, 584 F Supp at 430.
" See Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc, 760 F Supp 1486, 1495-98 (M D Fla
1991) (describing pornographic pictures displayed in lockers, offices, and other working
areas of defendant's shipyard).
584 F Supp at 423.
78 F3d at 1168.
119 F3d 1266 (7th Cir 1997).
o Id at 1274.
81 50 F3d at 431.
53 F3d 1531 (10th Cir 1995).
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league over the company CB radio, apparently regarding the
plaintiff, "Mark, sometimes don't you just want to smash a
woman in the face."' The Tenth Circuit characterized this re-
mark as simply "reflect[ing] a supervisor's frustration at being
unable to locate a female employee. " "
Second, courts continue to insist, as did the judges in
Rabidue, that there are types of harassing behavior that Title VII
was not meant to end. Gleason approved of such an exemption
because "vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo is inevitable
in the modern workplace, particularly from coarse and boorish
workers." 5 The Fifth Circuit holds that Title VII does not apply to
"everyday insults," or to the type of harassment which "does not
hinder a female employee's performance."6
The Ninth Circuit decision in Ellison v Brady,7 on the other
hand, embraced the view that the purpose of Title VII was indeed
to change the practices, and ultimately the attitudes, of male
workers disposed to sexual harassment:
Congress did not enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist
prejudices. To the contrary, "Congress designed Title VII
to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of
degradation which serve to close or discourage employ-
ment opportunities for women." . . . We hope that over
time both men and women will learn what conduct offends
reasonable members of the other sex. When employers and
employees internalize the standard of workplace conduct
we establish today, the current gap in perception between
the sexes will be bridged."
In his dissent in Rabidue, Judge Keith also disagreed with Judge
Krupansky's suggestion that Congress never intended to alter
male practices. He wrote that "Title VII's precise purpose is to
prevent such behavior and attitudes from poisoning the work en-
vironment of classes protected under the Act." 9
Not every post-Harris opinion articulates specific preconcep-
tions about men and women. But in the final analysis, judges
Id at 1542 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
" 118 F3d at 1144 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Weller v Citation Oil & Gas Corp, 84 F3d 191, 194 (5th Cir 1996).
924 F2d 872 (9th Cir 1991).
Id at 881, quoting Andrews v City of Philadelphia, 895 F2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir
1990).
805 F2d at 626 (Keith dissenting).
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necessarily evaluate a hostile environment case by drawing on
their understandings of or beliefs about the interrelationships
between women and men. To a woman who would strongly object
to a supervisor who attempts to look down her dress or who
feigns sexual arousal when he sees her, many post-Harris deci-
sions would seem inexplicably callous. The same decisions, how-
ever, are far more intelligible if one assumes that the authors
share the worldview so clearly articulated in 1986 in Rabidue.
II. THE ROLE OF JURIES IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
The practical significance of judicial attitudes towards and
assumptions about sexual harassment depends in large measure
on what role judges, rather than juries, play in deciding these
cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act")" created a right
to trial by jury in intentional discrimination cases; the legislative
history of that statute makes clear that Congress was especially
concerned to authorize jury trials in sex discrimination cases. De-
spite the 1991 Act, many appellate judges treat the determina-
tion as to the existence of a hostile work environment as if it were
a question of law.
A. The Role of Juries Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
At the time when Rabidue was decided, juries played no role
in Title VII cases. Prior to 1991 the only monetary relief available
in Title VII cases was back pay, and the lower courts had unani-
mously concluded that back pay was an equitable remedy. The
method for trying Title VII cases underwent a sea change in
1991, when the law was amended to authorize awards of compen-
satory and punitive damages, and to provide - in addition to
whatever the Seventh Amendment might require - a statutory
right to trial by jury when plaintiffs sought those remedies. Pro-
viding such awards and jury trials to sexual harassment plain-
tiffs was one of the central purposes of the 1991 Act.
In the highly partisan legislative history of the 1991 Act, the
proposal to provide for jury trials in intentional discrimination
cases was one of the most bitterly debated issues. Proponents of
the provision for compensatory and punitive damages believed
that back pay was an ineffective remedy for sexual harassment,9
and that it was inequitable to deny to Title VII plaintiffs reme-
' Pub L No 102-66, 105 Stat 1072 (1991), codified at 42 USC § 1981a (1994).
" Landgrafv USI Film Products, 511 US 244, 254 (1994).
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dies that were available under section 1981. From the beginning,
the drafts passed by the House and Senate also included a right
to a jury trial for plaintiffs seeking such damages.
Although employers and congressional opponents quickly
conceded that more monetary relief should be provided under Ti-
tle VII, they fiercely, but ultimately unsuccessfully, resisted jury
trials. Congress was divided for more than a year as opponents of
the jury trial provision proposed a series of amendments that
would have replaced damages and jury trials with "equitable
monetary awards," to be made by and at the discretion92 of dis-
trict judges.93 These amendments were repeatedly rejected on the
floors of both houses.
The critical distinction between these unsuccessful amend-
ments and the language repeatedly adopted by the House and
Senate, and ultimately agreed to by the President, was whether
judges or juries would award the additional monetary relief
which both sides agreed was needed. The proposed substitute
measures all contained language overturning the decision in Pat-
terson v McLean Credit Union." The practical effect of that lan-
guage, as members of both houses repeatedly noted, was to
authorize jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages for
a plaintiff seeking relief under Section 1981 for employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race. Thus the core issue that divided
Congress in 1990-1991 was whether victims of sex discrimination
should also receive the kind of jury trials provided for victims of
racial discrimination.
The opponents of the 1991 Act objected repeatedly to the pro-
posal to permit juries to decide Title VII intent cases.95 Their cen-
Supporters of the legislation objected to giving judges discretion to deny relief. See
136 Cong Rec S 16564 (Oct 24, 1990) (remarks of Sen Kennedy) ("[The White House bill]
would give courts vast discretion to deny any meaningful remedy to victims of even the
most offensive types of sexual and religious discrimination on the job."); 137 Cong Rec H
3860 (June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep Hughes). Under the substitute submitted by Robert
Michel, the presence of egregious conduct was one of the factors a judge could have consid-
ered in determining whether to award additional monetary relief.
' 136 Cong Rec S 9839 (July 17, 1990) (Kassebaum substitute); 137 Cong Rec H 3897
(June 4, 1991) (Michel substitute); Civil Rights Act of 1990: Message From the President
of the United States Transmitting Alternative Language to S 2104, HR Doc No 251, 101st
Cong, 2d Sess § 8 at 7-9 (1991) (legislation submitted by President Bush).
" 491 US 164, 184 (1989) (holding that racial harassment affecting the conditions of
employment was not actionable under § 1981).
9 136 Cong Rec S 16584 (Oct 24, 1990) (remarks of Sen Helms) (objecting to "unlim-
ited jury trials"); 136 Cong Rec H 6773 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep Sensenbrenner)
("Because this is a jury trial system, we turn unlawful employment activities into torts,
and the entire tort law system, with all of the warts ... end [sic] up going into the work-
place."); 136 Cong Rec H 6775 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep LaFalce) ("my biggest prob-
lem... [is] giving plaintiffs an absolute right to demand a jury trial upon an allegation of
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tral complaint was that juries were more likely than judges to
find intentional discrimination. Critics cited a study that pur-
ported to show that juries had ruled in favor of employees in a
large percentage of state employment cases.9 Representative
Hyde declared, "I would like some way to avoid the jury verdicts
because that is what terrorizes the employer."97 Representative
Stenholm complained that employers should not be subject to the
risk of litigation about their employment decisions because they
could not be confident that they could "convince a jury that those
decisions where [sic] justified," warning that some firms would
close rather than run the risk of a jury trial of discrimination
claims.9" Senator Hatch said a system of jury trials would be
"stacked in ... favor" of civil rights plaintiffs,9 and Senator
Thurmond endorsed a statement by a prominent business group
claiming that juries would disregard "the legal instructions pro-
vided by the judge" regarding punitive damages."° Opponents
repeatedly argued that if jury trials were permitted, employers
would (for some reason) start using employment quotas.1 °1 Repre-
sentative DeLay denounced the proposal for jury-imposed dam-
ages as "vicious and vindictive."'12
Jury trial supporters did not deny that juries might well de-
cide cases differently than judges; the long and ultimately suc-
cessful fight for jury trials was premised on just that conviction.
As was true at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amend-
ment, "Those who favored juries believed that a jury would reach
intentional discrimination"); 136 Cong Rec H 6798 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep
Bartlett); 136 Cong Rec H 6811 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep Sensenbrenner); 136 Cong
Rec H 9991 (Oct 17, 1990) (remarks of Rep Stenholm); 137 Cong Rec S 15468 (Oct 30,
1991) (remarks of Sen Symms); 137 Cong Rec H 3874 (June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep
Dornan); 137 Cong Rec H 3901 (June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep McCollum); 137 Cong Rec
H 3930 (June 5, 1991) (remarks of Rep Hyde); 137 Cong Rec H 3932 (June 5, 1991) (re-
marks of Rep Goodling); 137 Cong Rec H 9536 (Nov 7, 1991) (remarks of Rep Sensenbren-
ner).
" 136 Cong Rec S 9341 (July 10, 1990) (remarks of Sen Thurmond); 136 Cong Rec H
6787 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep Ballenger).
136 Cong Rec H 9403 (Oct 11, 1990).
136 Cong Rec H 9991 (Oct 17, 1990).
136 Cong Rec S 16566 (Oct 24, 1990).
100 136 Cong Rec S 9341 (July 10, 1990) (statement submitted by the United States
Chamber of Commerce).
101 136 Cong Rec H 9402-03 (Oct 11, 1990) (remarks of Rep Hyde); 137 Cong Rec H
3860 (June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep Holloway); 137 Cong Rec H 3864 (June 4, 1991) (re-
marks of Rep Hyde); 137 Cong Rec H 3885 (June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep Gunderson);
137 Cong Rec H 3885 (June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep Gunderson); 137 Cong Rec H 3894
(June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep Hyde); 137 Cong Rec H 3941-42 (June 5, 1991) (remarks of
Rep Gunderson).
1" 136 Cong Rec H 6789 (Aug 2, 1990).
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a result that a judge either could not or would not reach.""3 But
supporters insisted that the juries would nonetheless be fair. Op-
ponents argued that juries would be arbitrary and
unpredictable' and expressed doubts as to their competence to
decide liability issues.' 5 In response, jury trial supporters as-
serted that critics of that proposal "seem to have little faith in the
intelligence and common sense of jurors." 6 Representative
Collins contended that opposition to the legislation
shows a fear of the American people. Why do I say this?
Because damages are decided by juries. And juries are
American. Are we afraid that the same people who entered
a voting booth and elected us to our office can't be trusted
to enter a jury room and make a decision on punitive
damages?0 7
Supporters of the legislation offered detailed rebuttals to a
number of the attacks on civil juries. In reply to assertions that
juries were likely to make outlandishly large awards, l0 8 the spon-
sors proffered studies showing that jury awards in past discrimi-
nation cases generally had been modest.0 9 Responding to claims
that the availability of jury trials would lead to a flood of litiga-
tion, ° they noted that no such problem had existed under Sec-
tion 1981."' Significantly, however, no supporter ever rose to dis-
pute assertions that juries might rule in favor of discrimination
plaintiffs where judges would not, or to express the hope that
that would not occur.
" Parkland Hosiery Co, Inc v Shore, 439 US 322, 344 (1979) (Rehnquist dissenting).
10, 136 Cong Rec S 9340 (July 10, 1990) (statement submitted by the United States
Chamber of Commerce) (arguing that jury trials will be a "high-stakes lottery"); 136 Cong
Rec S 9897 (July 18, 1990) (remarks of Sen Gorton) (arguing that plaintiffs will sue in
hopes of winning a "jackpot"); 136 Cong Rec H 6791 (Aug 2, 1990) (arguing that plaintiffs
will "gamble for huge awards").
136 Cong Rec H 9989 (Oct 17, 1990) (remarks of Rep Fawell).
136 Cong Rec H 6800 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep Vento).
107 137 Cong Rec H 3859 (June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep Collins); see also 137 Cong
Rec H 3949 (June 5, 1991) (remarks of Rep Collins).
" See, for example, 136 Cong Rec S 9341 (July 10, 1990) (statement submitted by US
Chamber of Commerce); 136 Cong Rec S 15331 (Oct 16, 1990) (remarks of Sen Hatch); 136
Cong Rec H 6787 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep Ballenger); 136 Cong Rec H 6802 (Aug 2,
1990) (remarks of Rep Shumway).
10 136 Cong Rec S 9908 (July 18, 1990) (remarks of Sen Kennedy); 136 Cong Rec H
6812 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep Edwards); 136 Cong Rec H 9982 (Oct 17, 1990) (re-
marks of Rep Henry).
1' See, for example, 136 Cong Rec S 16580 (Oct 24, 1990) (remarks of Sen Burns).
. 136 Cong Rec H 6790 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep Slattery); 136 Cong Rec H
6800 (Aug 2, 1990) (remarks of Rep Vento).
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Because very few women or minorities have been appointed
to the federal judiciary since 1980, jury trial proponents were
well aware that if judges, rather than juries, decided sex dis-
crimination cases, the vast majority of those decisions would be
made by men and men alone.' On the other hand, federal law"3
as well as the Constitution, assured that a civil jury would in-
clude men and women with a wide range of experiences and per-
spectives. Congress could sensibly conclude that a jury, composed
of individuals with diverse backgrounds, would bring an invalu-
able understanding of workplace realities, of the nuances of race
and gender relations, and of the complexities of human motiva-
tion.
B. The Role of Juries in Post-Harris Litigation.
Because Harris involved pre-1991 harassment, it was tried
by a magistrate whose decision was then endorsed by the district
judge. By the mid-1990s, however, the cases reaching the appel-
late courts generally involved harassment which had occurred
after the effective date of the 1991 amendments to Title VII. In
these cases, a party appealing a decision after trial was generally
attacking a jury verdict, and an appeal following the grant of
summary judgment required an assessment of whether the dis-
pute should have been heard by a jury. This new procedure led
the federal courts to take very different approaches to harass-
ment complaints. As the Third Circuit recently noted,"" there is a
clear division among the circuits as to whether the existence vel
non of a hostile environment is a question of law, a question of
fact, or something in between. In the Second and Eighth Circuits,
strongly worded opinions insist that this is a factual issue and
that juries properly have the central role in its resolution; the
' In 1988, a year before it began work on what would become the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing devoted specifically to the small
number of women and minorities who had been appointed to the federal bench since 1980.
See The Performance of the Reagan Administration in Nominating Women and Minorities
to the Federal Bench, Hearings Before The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong, 2d Sess (1988). The hearing was prompted in particular by the fact that in the
1980s, at a time when the number of women attorneys was growing dramatically, the
proportion of women on the federal judiciary was actually declining; in 1987-88, 94.6
percent of all judicial nominees were men. Id at 3. From 1981 to 1988 all of the 14 new
judges in the District of Columbia circuit were white men. Id at 42. One witness argued
pointedly, "It is unseemly that all, or nearly all sex and race discrimination claims in a
given court should be heard by white male judges." Id at 144 (statement of Estelle H.
Rogers).
28 USC §§ 1861, 1863 (1994).
Konstantopoulos u Westvaco Corp, 112 F3d 710, 716 n 1 (3d Cir 1997).
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First, Third and Eleventh Circuits follow this approach. On the
other hand, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits gener-
ally treat these issues as matters for de novo consideration by
appellate judges. There are conflicting approaches to this problem
within the Fifth"5 and Tenth118 Circuits.
The leading Eighth Circuit decision, Hathaway v Runyon,"7
holds that because Harris refuses to provide mechanical rules,
courts ought to defer to juries, whose verdicts should almost al-
ways be upheld:
Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurring opinion that
since Congress set no clear standard defining a hostile en-
vironment, it must be left to "virtually unguided juries" to
decide whether particular conduct is "egregious enough" to
merit an award of damages.... There is no bright line be-
tween sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct
so a jury's decision must generally stand unless there is
trial error.'18
Other Eighth Circuit decisions rely on Hathaway to conclude
"whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the
hands of the jury."119 Some cases have stressed that the jury has
... Compare DeAngelis v El Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn, 51 F3d 591, 592 (5th
Cir 1995) ("In reviewing a jury verdict, we ... consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party defending the verdict, and we will reverse only when reasonable
minds in the exercise of impartial judgment could not have arrived at that verdict."), with
Williamson v Houston, 148 F3d 462, 468 (5th Cir 1998) ("Post-trial motions for judgment
as a matter of law are reviewed in the light most favorable to the jury's determinations.
Only when 'the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one
party that the Court believes that reasonable [people] could not arrive at a contrary ver-
dict' is granting judgment as a matter of law proper.") (citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
"' Compare Davis v United States Postal Service, 142 F3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir 1998)
(finding judgment as a matter of law for defendant improper so long as the plaintiff shows
that a "rational jury could find" an employer failed to remedy a hostile environment), and
Winsor v Hinckley Dodge, Inc, 79 F3d 996, 999 (10th Cir 1996) (stating that a district
court's findings following a bench trial are to be upheld unless clearly erroneous), with
Bolden v PRC Inc, 43 F3d 545, 552 (10th Cir 1994) ("We cannot infer racial animus under
the facts of this case.") (emphasis added). The decision in Smith v Norwest Financial Ac-
ceptance, Inc, 129 F3d 1408 (10th Cir 1997), appears to treat some hostile environment
issues as legal and some as factual. See id at 1413-15 (reviewing de novo the objective test
of a hostile workplace, and reviewing deferentially the sufficiency of the evidence estab-
lishing the pervasiveness of harassment).
M 132 F3d 1214 (8th Cir 1997).
.. Id at 1221, quoting Harris, 510 US at 24 (Scalia concurring).
"' Howard v Burns Brothers, Inc, 149 F3d 835, 840 (8th Cir 1998). See also Bailey v
Runyon, 167 F3d 466, 469 (8th Cir 1999), quoting Howard and Hathaway; Breeding v
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co, 164 F3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir 1999), quoting Howard.
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such a preeminent role because of the "'fact-intensive' nature of
the determination of whether a work environment is hostile."120
The Second Circuit in Gallagher v Delaney12 advanced a dif-
ferent reason for giving juries the central role in resolving sexual
harassment cases. It explained that juries were in fact more com-
petent than judges to adjudicate these controversies:
A federal judge is not in the best position to define the
current sexual tenor of American cultures in their many
manifestations.... [A] jury made up of a cross-section of
our heterogenous communities provides the appropriate
institution for deciding whether borderline situations
should be characterized as sexual harassment.... What-
ever the early life of a federal judge, she or he usually lives
in a narrow segment of the enormously broad American
socio-economic spectrum, generally lacking the current
real-life experience required in interpreting subtle sexual
dynamics of the workplace based on nuances, subtle per-
ceptions, and implicit communications. 12
A later Second Circuit decision relied on Gallagher to hold that
summary judgment will often be inappropriate in sexual harass-
ment cases.'23
Although explanations such as these are not widespread,
there are numerous appellate decisions that leave the resolution
of harassment claims largely to juries. The questions left for jury
resolution include not only the ultimate issue of whether there
was a hostile environment,'24 but also a large number of subsidi-
1 Bales v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 143 F3d 1103, 1109 (8th Cir 1998), quoting Crist v
Focus Homes, Inc, 122 F3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir 1997).
'2' 139 F3d 338 (2d Cir 1998).
Id at 342.
'23 Distasio v Perkin Elmer Corp, 157 F3d 55, 61 (2d Cir 1998) ("Summary judgment
should be used sparingly when as is often the case in sexual harassment claims, state of
mind or intent are at issue.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); but see
Brown v Coach Stores, Inc, 163 F3d 706, 713 (2d Cir 1998):
Brown also argues that she was subjected to a hostile work environment
at Coach .... The complaint does contend that one Coach supervisor
made, on occasion, racist remarks and one such comment was directed at
Brown.... [W]e find the allegations in the complaint lacking. Although
the alleged comments are despicable and offensive, they fail to constitute
discriminatory behavior that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to cause a
hostile environment.
" Bales v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 143 F3d at 1106; Davis v United States Postal Serv-
ice, 142 F3d at 1341; Crist v Focus Homes, Inc, 122 F3d at 1111 (8th Cir 1997); Amirmokri
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ary factual issues: whether the conduct was welcome,125 whether
the conduct was severe or pervasive, 2 ' whether there was a racial
or gender motive behind facially neutral harassment, 12 how to
interpret ambiguous actions or remarks, 2 ' whether hostile ac-
tions were in retaliation for the rejection of the harasser's ad-
vances, whether the plaintiff personally perceived the environ-
ment as hostile,121 whether a reasonable person in her position
would have done so,' s and whether the harassment affected the
victim's job performance.''
Other circuits take an entirely different approach. These ap-
pellate decisions contain numerous judge-made determinations of
whether or not - almost always not - a given set of circum-
stances create a hostile work environment. Most of these appel-
late opinions squarely decide the issue:
[Olur finding [is] that the record here does not establish
an objectively hostile work environment.1 2
Taking these incidents together, ... the atmosphere
was not severe enough or pervasive enough to create an
v Baltimore Gas & Electric Co, 60 F3d 1126, 1130-31 (4th Cir 1995); Phelps v Sears Roe-
buck & Co, 1993 US App LEXIS 33587, *8 n 1 (10th Cir) (unpublished disposition).
"2 Bales, 143 F3d at 1108; Quick v Donaldson Co, Inc, 90 F3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir
1996).
12 Mendoza v Borden, Inc, 158 F3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir 1998); (severity and perva-
siveness); Bales, 143 F3d at 1109 (severity and pervasiveness); Hathaway, 132 F3d at
1221 (severity and pervasiveness); Crist, 122 F3d at 1111 (8th Cir 1997) (severity); Morri-
son v Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc, 108 F3d 429, 438 (1st Cir 1997) (severity and pervasive-
ness).
127 Mendoza, 158 F3d at 1176-77; Hathaway, 132 F3d at 1222; Crist, 122 F3d at 1111;
Morrison, 108 F3d at 439; Kimzey v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 107 F3d 568, 574 (8th Cir 1997);
Quick, 90 F3d at 1379; Aman v Cort Furniture Rental Corp, 85 F3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir
1996).
28 Mendoza, 158 F3d at 1177 (11th Cir 1998); Gallagher, 139 F3d at 347; Aman, 85
F3d at 1082-83; Rodgers v Western-Southern Life Ins Co, 12 F3d 668, 676 (7th Cir 1993).
2 Crist, 122 F3d at 1111; Kirnzey, 107 F3d at 574.
" Phillips v Taco Bell Corp, 156 F3d 884, 888 (8th Cir 1998); Schwapp v Town of
Avon, 118 F3d 106, 112 (2d Cir 1997).
131 Mendoza, 158 F3d at 1176; Crist, 122 F3d at 1111.
" Black v Zaring Homes, Inc, 104 F3d 822, 827 (6th Cir 1997). See also Harrison v
Metropolitan Govt of Nashville, 80 F3d 1107, 1117 (6th Cir 1996) (overturning finding of
harassment following bench trial and stating "[als reprehensible as the incidents of al-
leged harassment may have been, we do not find that they constituted an unreasonably
abusive environment."); Harrington v Boysville of Michigan, Inc, 1998 US App LEXIS
9796, *14 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposition) (stating that "the comments did not create a
hostile work environment").
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objectively hostile work environment. We reach this con-
clusion by looking "at all the circumstances."3 '
[Incidents complained of] were not so frequent, pervasive
or pointedly insulting ... as to create an objectively hostile
working environment. 3 4
In deciding whether the harassment ... was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to bring it within Title VII's purview,
we must examine the totality of the circumstances....
[W]e are convinced that the conduct of which [the plaintiff]
complains was neither sufficiently severe nor sufficiently
pervasive to create an environment that a reasonable man
would find hostile or abusive."'
[W]e conclude, based on our own examination of the rec-
ord, that [the plaintiff] was not subjected to a hostile or
abusive working environment."6
" Cowan v Prudential Ins Co, 141 F3d 751, 757 (7th Cir 1998) (citation omitted); see
also Gleason v Mesirow Financial, Inc, 118 F3d 1134, 1145 (7th Cir 1997) ("[Wle are not
persuaded that [the perpetrator's] alleged conduct, objectively speaking, rose to the level
of actionable sexual harassment."); Koelsch v Beltone Electronics Corp, 46 F3d 705, 708
(7th Cir 1995) ("The crude conduct [plaintiff] alleges is simply not severe or pervasive
enough to render hers a hostile work environment."); Fernando v Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Lukes Medical Center, 1998 US App LEXIS 6530, *7 (7th Cir) (unpublished disposition)
(district court properly granted summary judgment based on lower court's "finding that
the incidents were too few in number, too infrequent, and too innocuous to create a hostile
work environment."); Ngeunjuntr v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 146 F3d 464, 467 (7th Cir
1998) (even on plaintiffs view of the facts "we would have to conclude that the evidence
presented does not reveal an environment sufficiently hostile that a reasonable person
would find it abusive").
" DeAngelis v El Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn, 51 F3d 591, 597 (5th Cir 1995)
(overturning jury verdict).
" Hopkins v Baltimore Gas & Electric Co, 77 F3d 745, 753 (4th Cir 1996) (same sex
harassment); id at 754 ("[W]e hold in this case that as a matter of law the conduct ... does
not create a sufficiently hostile environment on which to rest a Title VII claim."). See also
Hosey v McDonald's Corp, 1997 US App LEXIS 10713, *3 (4th Cir) (unpublished disposi-
tion) ("We agree with the district court's conclusion [in granting summary judgment to the
employer] that the facts as alleged by [plaintiff] were not sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create an abusive working environment."); Bonner v Payless Shoe Source, 1998 US App
LEXIS 7438, *6 (4th Cir) (unpublished disposition) ("In order to determine whether the
conduct alleged by [plaintiff] was sufficiently severe or pervasive to bring it within Title
VII's purview, we must examine the totality of the circumstances") (emphasis added); id
("[T]he conduct [plaintiff] alleges was not severe or pervasive enough to support his claim
that he worked in an objectively hostile work environment.").
" Konstantopoulos v Westvaco Corp, 112 F3d 710, 716 (3d Cir 1997).
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We hold that these incidents were not sufficiently offen-
sive or pervasive to constitute a hostile work
environment.'37
[W]e hold that the instances of which plaintiff complains
were not sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the condi-
tions of plaintiff's employment.'38
Some decisions uphold summary judgment for the defendant
on the ground that the appellate court is unable to find that a
hostile environment has indeed been created:
[Plaintiff] has failed to show under the totality of the cir-
cumstances that the harassing conduct was "so severe or
pervasive that it create[d] an abusive working environ-
ment.-' 39
[W]e conclude that neither of the [plaintiffs] established
an inference that they were subjected to a hostile work
environment because of their race.4 '
[W]e cannot hold that the frequency or severity of the
comments rose to the level of "unreasonably interfer[ing]"
with [plaintiffs] working environment.'
137 Williams v Goelitz Candy Co, 1997 US App LEXIS 33570, *7 (9th Cir) (unpub-
lished disposition); see also Smith v Oakland Scavenger Co, 1997 US App LEXIS 28737,
*13 (9th Cir) (unpublished disposition) ("These two episodes are not 'sufficiently severe or
persuasive [sic] to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment.'") (citation omitted).
" Houck v City of Prairie Village, 1998 US App LEXIS 30651, *8 (10th Cir) (unpub-
lished disposition). See also Howard v Beech Aircraft Corp, 1995 US App LEXIS 14692, *7
(10th Cir) (unpublished disposition) (agreeing with the district court's analysis, which
granted summary judgment because "the court cannot find that the plaintiff was subjected
to a pervasively hostile work environment") (emphasis added); Sprague v Thorn Americas,
Inc, 129 F3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir 1997) (stating that "our review of the remarks alleged
by [plaintiff] leads us to conclude that these remarks ... [did not] create an actionable
hostile work environment," and thus affirming summary judgment for the defendant).
" Callanan v Runyon, 75 F3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir 1996) (affirming grant of summary
judgment) (alteration in original), quoting Burns v McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc,
955 F3d 559, 564 (8th Cir 1992).
",o Drake v Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co, 134 F3d 878, 884 (7th Cir 1998).
.. McKenzie v Illinois Dept of Transportation, 92 F3d 473, 480 (7th Cir 1996), quoting
Harris, 510 US at 23.
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In all of these opinions the courts proceed on the assumption that
a determination regarding the presence or absence of such a hos-
tile environment is to be made by appellate judges.
There is relatively little discussion of why these judges think
that that determination should or could be made by an appellate
court rather than by a trier of fact. The Ninth Circuit holds that
the issue is simply a question of law: "whether the conduct [ ] was
sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute sexual harassment
is a question of law reviewed de novo."4  More recently the Sixth
Circuit has held that "[w]hether misconduct rises to the level of a
hostile work environment is a legal question.""" Why this would
be a question of law, however, is left unexplained.'" A later Sixth
Circuit decision describes the leading decision in that circuit,
Black v Zaring Homes, Inc," 5 as having held "that the defendant's
verbal conduct was not objectively hostile or abusive as a matter
of law."" ' The Fourth Circuit decision in Hartsell v Duplex Prod-
ucts, Inc," 7 insists that once a plaintiff's allegations are known,
"there are no questions of fact.""" This can fairly be understood as
an assertion that the analytic process which builds upon those
"' Fuller v City of Oakland, 47 F3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir 1995) (reversing decision by
trial judge in favor of defendant); Smith, 1997 US App LEXIS 28737 at *12, quoting
Fuller; but see Mullins v Campbell Soup Co, 1995 US App LEXIS 11918, *12 (9th Cir)
(unpublished disposition) (reversing summary judgment in favor of employer because
"[there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether a reasonable woman in [plaintiff's]
position would find her supervisor's conduct 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment'), quoting Ellison v
Brady, 924 F2d 872, 879 (9th Cir 1991).
" Stacy v Shoney's, lnc, 1998 US App LEXIS 6659, *8 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposi-
tion).
'" The Stacy court cites a district court opinion that notes the reluctance of courts to
grant summary judgment due to "the fact-specific nature of the inquiry into the merits of
hostile environment sexual harassment claims." Blankenship v Parke Care Center, Inc,
913 F Supp 1045, 1051 (S D Ohio 1995), cited in Stacy, 1998 US App LEXIS 6659 at *9.
Nonetheless, the Blankenship court found the issue of the level of conduct required for an
actionable workplace environment to be "a legal question ... appropriate for disposition
on summary judgment." 913 F Supp at 1051.
104 F3d 822 (6th Cir 1997).
Abeita v Transamerica Mailings, Inc, 159 F3d 246, 251 (6th Cir 1998). However, in
sustaining the decision of a district judge, following a bench trial, that no hostile work
environment had been proven, the Sixth Circuit used the "clear error" standard usually
reserved for decisions of fact. Hixson v Norfolk Southern Railway Co, 1996 US App LEXIS
15421, *9-10 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposition). Similarly, in reviewing a trial judge's
refusal to order a new trial after a jury returned a verdict for an employer, the Sixth Cir-
cuit was deferential to both the jury and the trial judge. Minor v Ford Motor Co, 1998 US
App LEXIS 30007, *7-8 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposition).
... 123 F3d 766 (4th Cir 1997).
" Id at 773 n 6. See id at 772 ("[T]he [ I allegations fail, as a matter of law.... The
events ... are simply insufficient to satisfy the requirement 'that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment.') (citation
omitted).
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subsidiary facts is some sort of legal conclusion, rather than the
sort of judgmental inference that a jury makes when it deter-
mines, for example, whether a product is unreasonably dangerous
or a defendant's actions were negligent. On the other hand, a
separate line of Fourth Circuit decisions insists that whether
"harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive is quintessentially
a question of fact.
" 149
The leading Seventh Circuit decision in Baskerville v Culli-
gan International Co, 5° insists that whether a given set of cir-
cumstances amounts to a hostile environment is often so clear as
to be within the province of a judge, but indicates that in a close
case the decision should be left to the jury. 5' The Baskerville ap-
proach is all the more unusual because under that decision
judges, not juries, in the first instance distinguish between an
environment which is "unpleasant" and one which is "hostile,"
hardly words with any legally established meaning. 52
One particularly distinct judicial methodology has developed
out of Baskerville. The Court of Appeals in that case reviewed the
ten different types of harassing behavior alleged, and concluded
'" Webb v Baxter Healthcare Corp, 1995 US App LEXIS 14534, *14 (4th Cir) (unpub-
lished disposition), quoting Beardsley v Webb, 30 F3d 524, 530 (4th Cir 1994), quoting
Paroline v Unisys Corp, 879 F2d 100, 105 (4th Cir 1989). The district court in Webb v
Baxter had granted summary judgment, explaining-
What we have got here is, I think, the classic, not so much hostile work
environment, as perhaps obnoxious work environment. I don't think there
is any question from this record that Mr. Harris would not be a pleasant
supervisor. He's got a true locker-room sense of humor. It was not in good
taste.
1995 US App LEXIS 14534 at *15. The court of appeals astutely commented, "This pas-
sage sounds more like a finding of fact than a ruling that a reasonable jury could make
only one finding of fact." Id.
150 50 F3d 428 (7th Cir 1995).
"' Id at 431:
It is not a bright line, obviously, this line between a merely unpleasant
working environment on the one hand and a hostile or deeply repugnant
one on the other; and when it is uncertain on which side the defendant's
conduct lies, the jury's verdict, whether for or against the defendant,
cannot be set aside in the absence of trial error.
In later Seventh Circuit decisions the jury's role in this line-drawing seems to disappear.
See, for example, Cowan, 141 F3d at 759. On the other hand, in reviewing a judge's deci-
sion, following a bench trial, that no hostile environment existed, the Seventh Circuit has
deferred to the findings of the trial judge, applying a "clear error" standard. King v MCI
Telecommunications Corp, 1998 US App LEXIS 9379, *4 (7th Cir) (unpublished disposi-
tion).
" See Brill v Lante Corp, 119 F3d 1266, 1275 (7th Cir 1997) ("[T]he incidents de-
scribed ... were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to sexual harassment un-
der the law of this circuit.") (Eschbach concurring) (emphasis added).
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that even in combination they were insufficient to establish a
hostile environment.153 Later decisions in the Seventh and Sixth
Circuits respectively have used Baskerville and the similar Sixth
Circuit decision in Black v Zaring Homes, Inc,54 as a legal "yard-
stick", against which to measure the facts of subsequent com-
plaints.'55 Other instances of harassment are deemed, as a matter
of law, not to create a hostile work environment if the abuses are
not more frequent or more severe than the incidents in Basker-
ville or Black.'56
Several appellate decisions also resolve subsidiary issues re-
lated to harassment claims. Although the judgments involved are
intensely fact-specific, the courts treat them as suitable for de
novo, if not nisi prius, resolution by an appellate court. Thus, in
DeAngelis v El Paso Municipal Police Officers Association,157 the
Fifth Circuit overturned a jury verdict for the plaintiff, holding
that a series of derogatory columns printed in her union newspa-
per did not "evince sufficient hostility toward her as a matter of
law." 8 In Gleason, the court affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant in part because it "reject[ed] Gleason's claim that she
subjectively experienced a sexually hostile work environment."15
The Court of Appeals in Koelsch v Beltone Electronics Corp,' af-
ter describing the abuse complained of, ruled "we do not find that
these incidents poisoned the workplace." 6' In addition, appellate
panels regularly decide whether particular facially neutral con-
" 50 F3d at 430-31.
" 104 F3d 822 (6th Cir 1997). Black compares the facts of that case with those of
Baskerville. Id at 826-27 and n 4.
" Gleason v Mesirow Financial, Inc, 118 F3d at 1144-46:
The trial judge in the case before us properly used Baskerville as a yard-
stick for determining whether Novak's conduct amounted to actionable
sexual harassment, and we agree with his conclusion that Novak's alleged
actions were 'actually less egregious than those reported in Baskerville.'
INleither of Novak's alleged remarks approach the level of offensiveness
displayed by the alleged harasser in Baskerville.
[T]he incidents ... do not rise to the level of actionable sexual harass-
ment, as defined in our case law.
"' Harrington, 1998 US App LEXIS 9796 at *14-15 (comparing facts with those in
Black); Skouby v Prudential Ins Co, 130 F3d 794, 797 (7th Cir 1997) (comparing facts to
those of Baskerville).
51 F3d 591 (5th Cir 1996).
Id at 596.
15 118 F3d at 1145.
16 46 F3d 705 (7th Cir 1995).
16' Id at 708.
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duct had an illicit motivation,"2 whether harassment interfered
with job performance, 63 and whether the harassment could be
characterized as "severe" or "pervasive.""
III. COGNIZABLE INCIDENTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Judge Krupansky's opinion in Rabidue v Osceola Refining
Co"6 5 summarized the holding as concluding that the evidence in
the case did not result in an environment "that could be consid-
ered intimidating, hostile, or offensive under 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(3) as elaborated upon by this court."' A key footnote
to this passage set out a specific methodology for analyzing
whether a pattern of sexual harassment was legal or not under
Title VII. After describing the facts of several prior cases in which
the plaintiff had prevailed, Judge Krupansky explained that the
incidents about which Rabidue had complained were different in
kind from the types of harassing actions in those cases:
In the case at bar, the charges of sexually hostile and abu-
sive environment were limited to pictorial calendar type
office wall displays of semi-nude and nude females and
Henry's off-color language. Unlike the facts of Bundy,"7
Henson,"6 and Katz,"9 this case involved no sexual propo-
sitions, offensive touchings, or sexual conduct of a similar
nature. 17
0
The clear implication of this passage was that only certain
kinds of sexually harassing incidents could be relied upon to es-
tablish an actionable hostile environment. Offensive touchings or
explicit sexual propositions, if present in sufficient number, could
add up to a hostile environment, but obnoxious language and
sexually explicit pictures could not, no matter how severe or per-
vasive. One Fourth Circuit decision applying Rabidue indicated
i" See Part IV.
See text accompanying notes 363-76.
1 See Part V.
805 F2d 611 (6th Cir 1986).
Id at 622 (emphasis added).
'" Bundy v Jackson, 641 F2d 934 (DC Cir 1981).
Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897 (11th Cir 1982).
Katz v Dole, 709 F2d 251 (4th Cir 1983).
47 805 F2d at 622 n 7.
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that harassing actions which were no more than "offensive" were
inherently insufficient to support a Title VII claim.'71
The decision in Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc,'72 should have
put an end to this approach. The plaintiff in Harris had not al-
leged any sexual propositions or unwelcome physical contact; the
jokes and innuendos of the harasser in Harris were mild stuff
compared to the harasser's behavior described in Rabidue. Yet
the Supreme Court had no doubt that it made sense to direct the
district court in Harris to assess carefully whether the facts of
that case met the standard announced in the Court's opinion. The
suggestion in Rabidue's footnote seven that only offensive touch-
ings and propositions were cognizable conflicted with the specific
statements in Harris and Meritor that actionable harassment
included "ridicule" and "insult."'73 Harris admonished that the
facts of Meritor could not be taken as "mark[ing] the boundary of
what is actionable," but that these facts represented an "espe-
cially egregious example[ ].174 This explanation rejected precisely
the sort of approach that the Sixth Circuit had used in footnote
seven of Rabidue.
More broadly, Harris made clear that the cognizable inci-
dents from which a hostile environment case was to be construed
were "discriminatory conduct."'75 Meritor had made the same
point, explaining that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Ti-
tle VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a
hostile or abusive work environment."'76 In Harris, the Court re-
iterated the passage in Meritor that established that Title VII
strikes at "the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women,"177 not merely that part of the spectrum involving explicit
sexual propositions or unwanted touching, or any other limited
portion. The Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc,171 was consistent with statements in Meri-
tor that Title VII was violated by discriminatory conduct which
created an "offensive" environment. 79 In Oncale, the Court ex-
1 Bowes v American Tobacco Co, 1991 US App LEXIS 3892, *6 (4th Cir) (unpub-
lished disposition).
7 510 US 17 (1993).
' Harris, 510 US at 21; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US at 64, 67
(1986) (noting epithets).
' 510 US at 22.
171 Id at 23.
176 477 US at 66 (emphasis added).
177 510 US at 17, quoting Meritor, 477 US at 64, quoting Los Angeles Dept of Water &
Power v Manhart, 435 US 702, 707 n 13 (1978).
523 US 75 (1998).
'" See Meritor, 477 US at 66, 67.
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plained that a sexual harassment plaintiff could prevail by es-
tablishing evidence of "behavior so objectively offensive as to alter
the 'conditions' of the victim's employment."1
80
After Harris, the issue that has most sharply divided the
lower courts is whether, as Judge Krupansky first suggested in
Rabidue, certain types of harassment are immune from consid-
eration or attack under Title VII because they are less extreme
than the practices condemned in Meritor. Five circuits have re-
jected such an approach, holding instead that any discriminatory
act of harassment can contribute to a hostile work environment.
In the Third Circuit, a cognizable incident need only be "dis-
crimination" and "detrimental[ ]"; "an employee can demonstrate
that there is a sexually hostile work environment without proving
blatant sexual misconduct." 8' In the Eleventh Circuit, the plain-
tiff must show simply that the incidents were "unwelcome" and
"based on sex.""8 2 The Eighth Circuit has approved of a jury in-
struction that the plaintiff need only show any practice of "dis-
crimination because of her sex by the intentional conduct of her
fellow employees consisting of unwelcome sexually motivated
conduct or other unwelcome conduct which was directed at [her]
because she is female."' In the Federal Circuit, "any harassment
or other unequal treatment of an employee ... that would not
occur but for the sex of the employee ... may, if sufficiently pat-
terned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment
under Title VII."'84 The Second Circuit relied on Harris in reject-
ing any suggestion that "employers are free from liability in all
but the most egregious of cases."185
523 US at 81 (emphasis added).
181 Spain v Gallegos, 26 F3d 439, 447 (3d Cir 1994) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Knabe v Boury Corp, 114 F3d 407, 410 (3d Cir 1997); Aman v
Cort Furniture Rental Corp, 85 F3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir 1996).
Mendoza v Borden, Inc, 158 F3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.1998).
Hathaway v Runyon, 132 F3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir 1997) (alteration in original); see
also Gillming v Simmons Industries, 91 F3d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir 1996); Quick v Donaldson
Co, Inc, 90 F3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir 1996) (evidence must show that "treatment" of em-
ployee of one gender was "worse than the treatment" of the other gender).
" King v Hillen, 21 F3d 1572, 1583 (Fed Cir 1994), quoting McKinney v Dole, 765
F2d 1129, 1138 (DC Cir 1985).
1" Torres v Pisano, 116 F3d 625, 631 (2d Cir 1997). In Gallagher v Delaney, 139 F3d
338 (2d Cir 1998), the court of appeals cited a pre-Harris decision that had "emphatically"
rejected a defense argument that a harasser's "conduct, though not a paradigm of modern
inter-gender workplace relations, was not pervasive enough to trigger relief, ... and fed-
eral law does not punish 'trivial behavior' consisting of only 'two kisses, three arm strokes,'
several degrading epithets and other objectionable - but ultimately harmless - conduct."
Id at 347 (alteration in original), quoting Carrero v New York City Housing Authority, 890
F2d 569, 578 (2d Cir 1989).
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Five other circuits have taken the opposite approach. As the
Seventh Circuit candidly explained in Gleason v Mesirow Finan-
cial, Inc,' and Galloway v General Motors Service Parts Opera-
tions,"8 7 the rule in that circuit, followed in practice by the others,
recognizes a "safe harbor for employers" for certain types of re-
marks and actions: "The central teaching of the Baskerville opin-
ion [is] that 'low-level harassment' is not actionable.""' Practices
which do not reach the requisite "level of offensiveness""" fall
within the safe harbor and cannot as a matter of law provide a
basis for a Title VII claim. These practices are, legally speaking,
harmless, regardless of how often they occur, of whether the em-
ployer was well aware of and indifferent to the problem, or, pre-
sumably, of whether they are tolerated or even sponsored as a
matter of written company policy.
The safe harbor doctrine has two somewhat distinct ration-
ales and, therefore, two somewhat distinct methodologies. The
first insists that the Title VII prohibition against sexual harass-
ment concerns, and is limited to, a particular paradigm. The typi-
cal elements of that paradigm are "sexual assaults ... uninvited
sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene language
or gestures; pornographic pictures." s° A sexual harassment claim
that is "far from the paradigmatic case of sexual harassment"'
falls outside the protections of Title VII.
The second somewhat more theoretical approach insists that
the law distinguishes between two categories of practices. The
first, too mild to give rise to a Title VII claim, is labeled, or more
accurately dismissed, as "offensive,"'92 "merely offensive,"9 s
"merely mildly offensive,""" "vulgarity," 95 "merely vulgar," 6
118 F3d 1134 (7th Cir 1997).
.87 78 F3d 1164 (7th Cir 1996).
' Gleason, 118 F3d at 1144.
Id at 1145; see also Galloway, 78 F3d at 1168 (hostile environment claim cannot be
grounded on "alleged harassing conduct [that] is too tepid").
"o Baskerville v Culligan Intl Co, 50 F3d 428, 430 (7th Cir 1995); see also Brill v
Lante Corp, 119 F3d 1266, 1274 (7th Cir 1997).
Hartsell v Duplex Products, Inc, 123 F2d 766, 773 (4th Cir 1997).
Shepherd v Comptroller of Public Accounts, 168 F3d 871 (5th Cir 1999).
Harrington v Boysville of Michigan, Inc, 1998 US App LEXIS 9796, *14 (6th Cir)
(unpublished disposition); Bermudez v TRC Holdings, Inc, 138 F3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir
1998); Black v Zaring Homes, Inc, 104 F3d 822, 826 (6th Cir 1997); Walker v Social Health
Assn of Greater Cincinnati, Inc, 1995 US App LEXIS 38830, *5 (6th Cir) (unpublished
disposition); Thomas v Shoney's, Inc, 1995 US App LEXIS 16456, *5 (4th Cir) (unpub-
lished disposition).
" Baskerville, 50 F3d at 431, quoting Carr v Allison Gas Turbine Division, 32 F3d
1007, 1010 (7th Cir 1994).
" Hopkins v Baltimore Gas & Electric Co, 77 F3d 745, 753 (4th Cir 1996), quoting
Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430.
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"tasteless,"19 7 "distasteful,"198 "insensitive,"' or "inappropriate." '
This category includes "vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innu-
endo, of coarse or boorish workers.2 0 Such harassment, however
pervasive, is never actionable because "Title VII was not designed
to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct
in the workplace,"" 2 but only "the kind of male attentions that
can make the workplace hellish for women."03
The second type of conduct which can support a hostile envi-
ronment claim is "deeply offensive," °4 "deeply repugnant,"2 5
"deeply disturbing, 0 6  "intimidating," °7  "physically
threatening,"0 5 "humiliating,"2°9 or "degrading."1 On this view,
"offensive" conduct by men is precisely the sort of problem that
Title VII was never intended to end and that women simply have
to put up with; mildly offensive conduct, Judge Posner maintains,
is not really "harassment" at all under Title VII.21" '
The courts that insist that a Title VII harassment claim can-
not be founded on verbal abuse or other merely "offensive" actions
often cite Harris. In that case, the Supreme Court explained that
its standard "takes a middle ground between making actionable
any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to
cause a tangible psychological injury."212 Meritor had explained
that in order to show "an offensive work environment," "2 ' the
plaintiff had to prove more than "mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
Baskerville, 50 F3d at 431; Gleason, 118 F3d at 1144; Carr, 32 F3d at 1010.
Hopkins, 77 F3d at 753.
Baskerville, 50 F3d at 431.
1 Bermudez, 138 F3d at 1181; see also Hartsell, 123 F3d at 773.
Black, 104 F3d at 826.
2 Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430; see also Hartsell, 123 F3d at 772 ("Title VII does not
attempt 'to purge the workplace of vulgarity.'), quoting Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430; Spra-
gue v Thorn Americas, Inc, 129 F3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir 1997) (remarks not actionable
because merely "unpleasant and boorish").
Hartsell, 123 F3d at 773, quoting Hopkins, 77 F3d at 754.
Id, quoting Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430.
Baskerville, 50 F3d at 431, quoting Carr, 32 F3d at 1010; Gleason, 118 F3d at
1144, quoting Carr, 32 F3d at 1010.
2 Baskerville, 50 F3d at 431.
Id.
Carr, 32 F3d at 1009.
Crawford, 96 F3d at 836.
Id.
211 Carr, 32 F3d at 1009.
21 Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430-31.
212 50 US at 21.
212 477 US at 66.
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employee."214 This line of post Harris cases converts the Harris
and Meritor rule that one offensive utterance does not create a
hostile environment into a doctrine that merely "offensive" utter-
ances, no matter how numerous, cannot create such an environ-
ment. Thus in Bermudez v TRC Holdings, Inc,21 the district court
asserted that "Harris rejects the option of treating as discrimina-
tory 'any conduct that is merely offensive.'"2" This is correct in
the sense that Harris held that one offensive action does not cre-
ate a hostile environment, but inaccurate insofar as it implies
that Harris held that offensive conduct can never create such an
environment. Black v Zaring Homes, Inc,"7 and Saxton v Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co,2"s quote the words "merely offen-
sive" from this passage in Harris without any mention of how the
Supreme Court used that phrase.'
A dispute about whether "offensive" conduct can form the
basis of a Title VII hostile environment reflects the underlying
division among the lower courts about the safe harbor doctrine. A
dozen decisions insist that offensive conduct is precisely what
Title VII does not forbid;220 a comparable number of cases hold the
opposite.221 A similar dispute exists about whether "vulgar"'22 or
"coarse "22 remarks can form the basis of a hostile environment
claim.
These differences in standards predictably lead to inconsis-
tent treatment of similar practices. Thus in the Seventh Circuit it
is not sufficiently objectionable that a supervisor remarked that
211 Id at 67 (emphasis added), quoting Rogers v EEOC, 454 F2d 234, 238 (5th Cir
1971).
" 138 F3d 1176 (7th Cir 1998).
Id at 1181, quoting Harris, 510 US at 21.
SI? 104 F3d 822 (6th Cir 1997).
10 F3d 526 (7th Cir 1993).
219 Black, 104 F3d at 826; Saxton, 10 F3d at 535.
"' See cases cited in notes 192-94
Davis v United States Postal Service, 142 F3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir 1998); Torres v
Pisano, 116 F3d 625, 633 n 7 (2d Cir 1997), citing Andrews v City of Philadelphia, 895 F2d
1469, 1486 (3d Cir 1990); Hirase-Doi v U.S. West Communications, Inc, 61 F3d 777, 781
(10th Cir 1995); Doe v R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co, 42 F3d 439, 444 (7th Cir 1994); Dey v
Colt Construction & Development Co, 28 F3d 1446, 1455 (7th Cir 1994); King v Hillen, 21
F3d 1572, 1583 (Fed Cir 1994) ("The criterion is not what a reasonable woman employee is
capable of enduring, but whether the offensive acts alter the conditions of employment.").
Note that the decision in Baskerville declaring "offensive" conduct insufficient to support a
hostile environment claim disregarded two prior Seventh Circuit decisions to the contrary.
2 Compare cases cited in notes 195-96 with DeAngelis v El Paso Municipal Police
Officers Assn, 51 F3d 591, 595 (5th Cir 1995) (finding no hostile work environment where
a newsletter column "did not represent ... a campaign of vulgarity perpetrated by co-
workers") and Morrison v Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc, 108 F3d 429, 439 (1st Cir 1997).
Compare Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430, with Reed v AW. Lawrence & Co, Inc, 95 F3d
1170, 1179 (2d Cir 1996).
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his office was "hot" once the plaintiff entered.224 Meanwhile in the
Eleventh Circuit a plaintiff can base a harassment claim, in part,
on a supervisor's assertion that he got "fired up" when she en-
tered his office.225 Disagreements exist about whether specific
types of conduct or verbal abuse are covered by Title VII at all:
insults,2 ' lewd gestures,227 staring or ogling,2 guttural noises,22 s
following the plaintiff,2 0 screaming at the plaintiff,2"' use of the
word "bitch," 2 kicking,2 3 and expressing anger in sexist lan-
guage.2
34
M Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430.
Mendoza, 158 F3d at 1175.
Compare Crawford, 96 F3d at 833 (finding references to the part of the office with
older workers as "the dumb side" or "the worthless side" insufficient to support age har-
assment claim), and Gleason, 118 F3d at 1144-45 (finding merely. "inappropriate" re-
peated references to female customers of brokerage as "dumb"), with Morrison, 108 F3d at
434 (lst Cir 1997) (finding that allegedly gender based statement to plaintiff that she was
"dumb" would support a sex harassment claim; claim also supported by statement to
plaintiff that "her place was in the kitchen"); Kirnzey v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 107 F3d 568,
571 (8th Cir 1997) (finding that repeated references by perpetrator to plaintiff as 'damn
dummy" and "idiot" support harassment claim). The harassment claim in Harris relied
significantly on non-sexual insults. 510 US at 19.
Compare Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430 (gesture indicating masturbation insufficient
to support sexual harassment claim), with Davis, 142 F3d at 1337 (evidence that perpetra-
tor made a 'sexually obscene" gesture at plaintiff supported sexual harassment claim).
Compare Penry v Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F3d 1257, 1260, 1263
(10th Cir 1998) (despite having made explicitly sexual remarks, actions of perpetrators in
repeatedly staring at plaintiff and "repeatedly tr[ying] to look down her blouse" dismissed
as "gender-neutral antics"), and Gleason, 118 F3d at 1144-45 (dismissing "ogling" as
merely 'inappropriate"), with King, 21 F3d at 1574 (sexual harassment claim supported
by evidence that perpetrator "looked at [complainant's] body in a sexually suggestive
manner").
See notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
' Compare Penry, 155 F3d at 1260, 1263 (despite other explicitly sexual remarks,
dismissing act of perpetrator in 'following [plaintiff] constantly when she got up to go to
the breakroom or the bathroom" as "gender-neutral antics"), with Mendoza, 158 F3d at
1175 (11th Cir 1998) (finding perpetrator's action in following plaintiff sufficient to sup-
port sexual harassment claim).
"' Compare Brill v Lante Corp, 119 F3d 1266, 1274 (7th Cir 1997) (holding 'yelling at
[plaintiff] while 'towering' over her" insufficient to support a sexual harassment claim),
with Morrison, 108 F3d at 434 (holding that regularly screaming at female employees,
"but not at the men," contributed to a hostile work environment).
2 Compare Galloway, 78 F3d at 1168 (finding incessant use of the epithet "sick
bitch" not sufficient without more to support sexual harassment claim), and Gleason, 118
F3d at 1145 (finding reference to female customers as "bitchy" merely "inappropriate"),
with Morrison 108 F3d at 434 (finding that use of the term does support sexual harass-
ment claim), and Kimzey, 107 F3d at 571 (same), and Phelps v Sears Roebuck & Co, 1993
US App LEXIS 33587, *10 (10th Cir) (unpublished disposition) (same).
' Compare Hartsell, 123 F3d at 769, 773 (holding that kicking and shoving plaintiffs
chair were too trivial to support a harassment claim), with Kimzey, 107 F3d at 571 (hold-
ing that evidence that harasser kicked legs of female employees and shook ladder on
which plaintiff was standing would support a harassment claim).
' Compare Gross v Burggraf Construction Co, 53 F3d 1531, 1542 (10th Cir 1995)
("sometimes don't you just want to smash a woman in the face" dismissed as merely re-
flecting "a supervisor's frustration at being unable to locate a female employee"), with
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In the safe harbor circuits, incidents such as the following
were deemed too mild to support a hostile environment claim:
Making a "grunting sound" when plaintiff wore a leather
skirt.3
5
Referring at meeting to a plot of land as "Titsville," "Twin
Peaks," and "Hootersville."3 6
Frequent in-office references to a local strip club and the
exploits there of male workers, and circulation of photo-
graph of one male worker with one of the strippers. 7
References to women as "bloodsuckers," "leeches" and
"dizzy broads."238
Announcing to plaintiff when she began work, 'We've
made every female in this office cry like a baby. We will do
the same to you. Just give us time. We will find your
weakness."" 9
Directing at plaintiff sexual references, such as inquiry as
to whether one male worker was "eating her"; sending
plaintiff a drawing "of a body which had been slit [and] a
match representing an erect penis was attached."4 °
Looking down the plaintiffs dress, explaining "well, you
got to get it when you can. '"41
Winsor v Hinckley Dodge, Inc, 79 F3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir 1996) (finding that use of gender
specific epithets to express anger constitutes actionable harassment even if underlying
anger is not gender based).
Baskerville, 50 F3d at 430.
Black, 104 F3d at 823-24.
Cowan, 141 F3d at 756.
Id.
Hartsell, 123 F3d at 768.
Skouby v Prudential Insurance Co, 130 F3d 794, 796 (7th Cir 1997).
Sprague v Thorn Americas, Inc, 129 F3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir 1997).
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Repeatedly attempting to look down the plaintiff's dress,
and remarking "your elbows are the same color as your
nipples."242
Conversely, in the circuits more faithful to Harris, practices that
are comparable to or milder than these have supported such a
claim:
Frequent gifts, compliments and lunch invitations, but no
off-color remarks.243
Referring to female physician by her first name only while
referring to male physicians with the title "Doctor" and
their last names; asking a female physician why she did
not go into nursing or get married rather than becoming a
doctor; referring to plaintiff as a "babe" and suggesting she
go into modeling rather than medicine.'
IV. HARASSMENT THAT Is NON-SEXUAL
The plaintiff in Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co,24 alleged
that, in addition to the expressly sexual harassment, she had
been continually mistreated on account of her gender in a number
of facially neutral ways. She asserted that she had been denied
the perquisites accorded to other managers, such as free lunches
and entertainment privileges, and that she was forbidden to take
male customers to lunch, undermined when she issued orders,
and directed to sit with the secretaries at a meeting.246 There was
direct evidence that some of these incidents were based on
Rabidue's sex."7 In his dissenting opinion in Rabidue, Judge
Keith suggested that the defendant's history of tolerating sexual
harassment and misogyny tended to support the plaintiff's claims
that these facially neutral practices stemmed from a discrimina-
22 Shepherd, 168 F3d at 872.
Gallagher v Delaney, 139 F3d 338, 343-44 (2d Cir 1998).
24 Smith v Saint Louis University, 109 F3d 1261, 1262-63 (8th Cir 1997).
805 F2d 611 (6th Cir 1985).
21 Id at 624 (Keith dissenting).
24" For example, Rabidue's supervisor stated that the company needed a man in her
job, since the plaintiff "can't take customers out to lunch." Id. Another supervisor ex-
plained to Rabidue that she could not do so because it would appear improper "for a
woman to take male customers to lunch." Id. But as the dissenting judge noted, "defen-
dant apparently saw no problem in male managers entertaining female clients regardless
of marital status." Id.
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tory motive.248 The district judge in Rabidue, however, summarily
dismissed plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim alleging all these inci-
dents on the ground that they involved fringe benefits;249 in the
Sixth Circuit Judge Krupansky simply ignored them
altogether.25 °
Under the paradigm rationale of the safe harbor doctrine,
gender-neutral harassment would seem to have no particular
relevance to a hostile environment claim. A number of decisions
appear to proceed on just that premise, largely ignoring this type
of claim and evidence just as Judge Krupansky did in Rabidue, or
expressly dismissing such evidence precisely because it is facially
sex-neutral.251 Other circuits correctly insist that harassment of a
non-sexual nature can support a basis for a hostile environment
claim.252
" Id at 625.
... Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co, 584 F Supp 419, 436 (E D Mich 1984).
' Although recognizing that plaintiff was legitimately "annoyed" at Henry and nu-
merous other male workers for making crude remarks or posting sexually explicit posters
in work areas, Krupansky criticized Rabidue for her failure to "work harmoniously with
co-workers." 805 F2d at 615. It appears never to have occurred to him or Judge Newblatt
that the misconduct of the male workers might have led in whole or part to the conflicts
between them and Rabidue.
.5 See, for example, Morrison v Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc, 108 F3d 429, 441.(lst Cir
1997) (in order for harassing conduct to support sexual harassment claim "the overtones of
such behavior must be, at the very least, sex-based, so as to be a recognizable form of sex
discrimination"); Provencher v CVS Pharmacy, Division of Melville Corp, 145 F3d 5, 16
(1st Cir 1998) (same); Harrison v Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 80 F3d 1107,
1113, 1115-17 (6th Cir 1996) (ignoring findings of racially discriminatory discipline and
training in holding there was no hostile environment and that certain harassment inci-
dents had no racial connotation); Johnson v City of Fort Wayne, 91 F3d 922, 938 (7th Cir
1996) (upholding award of summary judgment dismissing hostile environment claim while
remanding for trial of claims of discrimination in exclusion from meetings and of unlawful
demotion: "Mr. Johnson does not allege that he was subjected to racial slurs, epithets, or
other overtly race-related conduct in the workplace. His allegations of harassment do not
fit neatly into the traditional analysis of a hostile work environment claim"); Gebers v
Commercial Data Center, Inc, 1995 US App LEXIS 614, *9 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposi-
tion) (finding alleged retaliatory job assignment and denial of assistance at work irrele-
vant to hostile environment claim because the practices were "sex neutral"); Moyo v Go-
mez, 1998 US App LEXIS 26207, *3 (9th Cir) (unpublished disposition) (affirming dis-
missal of racial harassment case because the harassment was not "verbal or physical
conduct of a [racial] nature") (alteration in original).
See, for example, Phelps v Sears Roebuck & Co, 1993 US App LEXIS 33587, *9-10
(10th Cir) (unpublished disposition); Van Steenburgh v Rival Co, 171 F3d 1155, 1159 (8th
Cir 1999) ("Rival is mistaken in asserting that there must be incidents... that are explic-
itly sexual."); Hathaway v Runyon, 132 F3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir 1997) (jury could infer
that gender-neutral menacing behavior was result of gender related motive and therefore
supported harassment claim); Kopp v Samaritan Health System, Inc, 13 F3d 264, 269 (8th
Cir 1993) ("The predicate acts which support a hostile-environment sexual-harassment
claim need not be explicitly sexual in nature"; claim could be grounded in part in gender-
neutral physical threats if motive proved); McKinney v Dole, 765 F2d 1129, 1138 (DC Cir
1985) (holding that a hostile environment claim can be based on physical assault: "We
have never held that sexual harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee ...
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Yet a third line of decisions acknowledges that facially neu-
tral harassment would be relevant if directed at a victim because
of her sex, but then summarily dismisses just such claims as
groundless.253 Viewing these claims in isolation, a trier-of-fact
would determine the motive behind such an incident using the
methodology set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green,254 and
its progeny. But in most sexual harassment cases, the same peo-
ple who engaged in the gender-neutral actions also made gender-
specific remarks about the plaintiff or about other women. Ordi-
narily, the trier of fact could of course regard these gender-
specific remarks as evidence of gender-based motives or animus
that might well explain the gender-neutral acts. A number of
lower courts have properly insisted that evidence of those re-
marks supports the inference that the other actions were improp-
erly motivated. Thus these courts require a trial on the merits
regarding the gender-neutral acts.255 But in the safe harbor cir-
cuits, appellate judges - in the teeth of avowedly sexist remarks
by the perpetrators - insist that the plaintiff cannot rely on the
gender-neutral harassment because there is "no evidence" it was
related to her sex.256
that occurs because of the sex of the employee must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the
form of sexual advances or of other incidents with clearly sexual overtones. And we decline
to do so now."); Stacks v Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc, 27 F3d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir
1994) (holding that a hostile environment claim can be supported by evidence of discrimi-
natory discipline); Spain v Gallegos, 26 F3d 439, 447 (3d Cir 1994) (holding that a hostile
environment claim can be based on actions which "are not sexual by their very nature"),
quoting Andrews v City of Philadelphia, 895 F2d 1469, 1482 n 3 (3d Cir 1990); Trujillo v
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, 157 F3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir 1998) (racial
harassment).
' See Penry v Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir
1998) (affirming award of summary judgment and summarily dismissing 200 paragraphs
of detailed factual allegations of harassment on the ground that the behavior "seems moti-
vated by poor taste and a lack of professionalism rather than by the plaintiffs' gender").
411 US 792 (1973).
=" See Van Steenburgh, 171 F3d at 159 (holding that a jury could infer a "nexus'
between a supervisor's "hostile manner" and plaintiff's rejection of his sexual advances);
Mendoza v Borden, Inc, 158 F3d 1171, 1175-76 (11th Cir 1998) (holding that plaintiff's
claim that staring was part of sexual harassment is supported by a prior incident in which
same individual stared at plaintiffs groin area while making a sniffing sound); Aman v
Cort Furniture Rental Corp, 85 F3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir 1996) (holding that in light of rac-
ist remarks by company officials who had allegedly harassed the plaintiff, a jury could find
that facially neutral harassment was "part of a complex tapestry of discrimination").
' Hardin v S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc, 167 F3d 340, 346, 345 (7th Cir 1999) (holding
that "nothing suggests [race and gender neutral acts] were motivated by discrimination,"
notwithstanding evidence that the harasser referred to plaintiff and other black women as
"stupid black bitches," "black cunts," and "stupid niggers"); Drake v Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co, 134 F3d 878, 881, 885-86 (7th Cir 1998) (affirming summary judgment
on ground that there was no evidence that harassment of white plaintiff was due to his
association with and support of black workers, even though the record was "replete with
evidence that some of the employees ... were racial bigots,"); Hartsell v Duplex Products,
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In a similar vein, a number of lower court decisions hold that
a sexual harassment plaintiff cannot base her claim on abuse
that was directed at her for spurning the advances of the perpe-
trator,257 or for having complained about his conduct. Such mis-
conduct, they reason, is retaliation, not sexual harassment, and
so it must be considered separately.25 s These limitations are even
Inc, 123 F3d 766, 773 (4th Cir 1997) (holding summary judgment appropriate because
plaintiff cannot show that most alleged harassment, which was gender neutral, was the
result of an impermissible motive; however, harassers had told plaintiff they intended to
drive her to tears, as they had "every female in this office," and admonished her to "go
home and fetch [her] husband's slippers like a good little wife") (alteration in original);
Crawford v Medina General Hospital, 96 F3d 830, 836 (6th Cir 1996) (affirming summary
judgment because of a lack of evidence that repeated insulting remarks were based on
plaintiff's age, although perpetrator had allegedly asserted "I don't think women over 55
should be working" and "[o]ld people should be seen and not heard"); Gross v Burggraf
Construction Co, 53 F3d 1531, 1542-46 (10th Cir 1995) (holding that plaintiff failed to
offer evidence that a variety of gender neutral practices were the result of an impermissi-
ble practice, even though perpetrator had admittedly once remarked about plaintiff,
"sometimes don't you just want to smash a woman in the face"); Bolden v PRC Inc, 43 F3d
545, 551 (10th Cir 1994) (affirming summary judgment because of lack of evidence that
ridicule and insults were racially motivated despite fact that perpetrator had often used
the term "nigger"); Walk v Rubbermaid Inc, 1996 US App LEXIS 5494, *6 (6th Cir) (un-
published disposition) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff "failed to show"
that "foul and abusive language" directed at her was "based on her sex," despite the fact
that the harasser had repeatedly referred to plaintiff and other female workers as "meno-
pausal bitches").
27 In Galloway v General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78 F3d 1164 (7th Cir
1996), the plaintiff was the target of a protracted campaign of harassment directed at her
by a fellow worker after she ended a romantic relation with him. The perpetrator did not
treat any men in that manner. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could not "ra-
tionally consider herself at a disadvantage in relation to her male co-workers by virtue of
being a woman." Id at 1168. Rather, Judge Posner explained, the harassment was merely
the result of "personal animosity arising out of the failed relationship." Id. The fact that
that relationship was based on the plaintiff's gender was somehow irrelevant to whether
the harassment which followed was itself related to gender. On Judge Posner's view, the
harassment was no more gender related than if it had arisen out of a failed business deal.
The Eighth Circuit took the opposite approach in Van Steenburgh. In that case, the
Court of Appeals upheld a sexual harassment claim based on gender neutral abuse which,
the court noted, a jury could find arose out of the plaintiff's "repeated rejections of [the
perpetrator's] prior sexual overtures." 171 F3d at 1159.
In McKenzie v Illinois Dept of Transportation, 92 F3d 473 (7th Cir 1996), the plain-
tiff was subjected to gender neutral harassment after she complained about earlier sexual
harassment. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's EEOC charge was inadequate
to raise any claims about the gender-neutral harassment, in part because she had not
checked the box for "retaliation" on the form. Id at 481. In Morrison, a jury found that the
plaintiff had been the subject of sexual harassment during a period after November 21,
1991. 108 F3d at 432. Prior to that date the plaintiff had been the target of a campaign of
expressly sexual harassment, about which she had complained in vain to the company.
After that date the overtly sexual harassment ended, but fellow employees circulated a
petition supporting the harassers and refused to speak with the plaintiff, and the em-
ployer allegedly interfered with her work. Id at 435-36. In overturning the jury verdict,
the Court of Appeals held, "If the Company deliberately sought to isolate or punish Morri-
son for her earlier complaints of harassment, by telling other employees not to speak to
her, such conduct might have supported a claim for unlawful retaliation, but not for sex-
ual harassment." Id at 441.
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more important where courts apply a very narrow conception of
"facially discriminatory actions." In Howard v Beech Aircraft
Corp,259 for example, the Tenth Circuit held that a foreman's re-
mark that "the smartest woman at Beech was not as smart as the
dumbest man," was "not overtly sexual enough."6
After a court excludes these different sorts of facially-neutral
harassment, and then applies the safe harbor doctrine to exclude
evidence of gender-specific abuse that is merely "offensive," a
harassment victim may be left with no incidents at all on which
to base her hostile environment claim. Even where some inci-
dents have survived this process of elimination, lower court case
law regarding the frequency of harassment needed to show per-
vasiveness will often be fatal to the remaining claims.
V. HARASSMENT AS A "CONDITION" OF EMPLOYMENT
In five different opinions, the Supreme Court has held that a
Title VII violation can be established by evidence that the har-
assment was sufficiently "severe or pervasive."26' But neither "se-
verity" nor "pervasiveness" are technical terms with any talis-
manic significance. Rather, both Harris and Meritor hold that the
dispositive issues in a harassment case are (1) whether the "con-
ditions" of employment were altered at all, and (2) whether the
resulting condition or environment was hostile or abusive.262 Thus
Meritor explained that an isolated incident might not "affect[ ] a
'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning
of Title VII,""6 3 and that even when conditions were altered that
might not be "to [a] sufficiently significant degree to violate Title
VII."2 4 Harris reiterated that there must be a demonstration both
that the alleged conduct has "actually [ ] altered the conditions of
1995 US App LEXIS 14692 (10th Cir) (unpublished disposition).
"' Id at *6, *7. The same supervisor repeatedly commented that the plaintiff had
"Martha Lattamore syndrome," which the plaintiff took as a reference to the size of her
breasts. Id at *6-7. To an employee who knew Ms. Lattamore the meaning of this remark
might have been crystal clear, but for the Tenth Circuit - none of whose members had
worked at the office at issue - it was sufficiently opaque to fall outside the scope of Title
VII. Obviously this approach encourages harassers to resort to such devices.
" Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 67 (1986); Harris v Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21 (1993); Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 78
(1998); Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2265 (1998); Faragher v City of
Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2283 (1998).
' In Quick v Donaldson Co, Inc, 90 F3d 1372 (8th Cir 1986), the Court of Appeals
correctly separated these two elements, noting that the first was whether the alleged
harassment was "'sufficiently severe or pervasive' to affect [the victim's] conditions of
employment." Id at 1379.
477 US at 67.
' Id, citing Rogers v EEOC, 454 F2d 234, 238 (5th Cir 1971).
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the victim's employment" and that it had "sufficiently affect[ed]
the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII."' 6 In Oncale
v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 6' the Court again explained
that one distinct element of a hostile work environment case was
proof that the behavior complained of was sufficient "to alter the
'conditions' of the victim's employment."' 7 These consistent
statements provide an intelligible account of why the frequency or
severity of the incidents would matter.
In order to make sense of the phrase "severe or pervasive" as
the Supreme Court used it in Meritor and its progeny, one must
have some understanding of how severe or pervasive harassment
could create a discriminatory environment. In its most literal
sense, "environment" refers to a continuous physical presence -
for example the level of ozone or particulate constantly in the air.
But even in the worst harassment cases, such as the egregious
facts of Meritor, harassment usually is not literally continual.268 If
one analyzed separately each of the 2400 minutes in a forty hour
week, the record in Meritor would surely have shown that har-
assment was actually occurring during only a very small portion
of those moments."9 What is consistently present in a work "envi-
ronment" - be it happy, dull, or hostile - is the subjective men-
tal response of the victim, a circumstance which derives directly
from the harasser's attitude and actions. A distinct environment
arises where a victim concludes that one or more supervisors
have engaged in misconduct, not because of an isolated misjudg-
ment, but because - as one employer's general counsel explained
with resignation - "Well, that's just the way they are."'27 A
plaintiff is working in a discriminatory environment when she
'" 510 US at 21-22, 21 (1993).
.. 523 US 75 (1998).
Id at 81.
In the reported cases there are a few idiosyncratic situations in which the harass-
ment is physically continuous, such as the posters in Rabidue. See Rabidue v Osceola
Refining Co, 805 F2d 611, 623-24 (6th Cir 1985) (Keith dissenting) (describing nude post-
ers displayed in the workplace).
" See Draper v Coeur Rochester, Inc, 147 F3d 1104, 1108 n 1 (9th Cir 1998) ("[A]
hostile work environment is ambient and persistent, and [ ] it continues to exist between
overt manifestations.").
270 Black v Zaring Homes, Inc, 104 F3d 822, 824 (6th Cir 1997); see also Breeding v
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co, 164 F3d 1151, 1155 (8th Cir 1999) (supervisor responded to
complaint about harasser by acknowledging, "that is just the way he is"); Howard v Burns
Brothers, Inc, 149 F3d 835, 838 (8th Cir 1998) (general manager, in response to complaint
about harasser, advised plaintiff, "That's just Keith"); Varner v National Super Markets,
Inc, 94 F3d 1209, 1211 (8th Cir 1996) ("That's just Bob being himself"); Hirase-Doi v U.S.
West Communications, Inc, 61 F3d 777, 780 (10th Cir 1995) (manager responded to com-
plainant by advising the victim that "she should expect [intimidating stares]" from the
perpetrator after the manager had reprimanded him for sexual harassment).
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perceives that she is at risk of significant further misconduct.271
Thus Harris held that a victim's subjective responses - her re-
luctance to remain at the job - were probative.272
Three examples support this interpretation of the term "hos-
tile environment." First, if in Meritor Ms. Vinson had had a bout
of amnesia, it would make no sense to say that she was in a hos-
tile environment the moment she returned to work. Her work
environment would become hostile (again) only after she re-
learned how the harasser in that case was acting. Second, in a
typical harassment case (at least absent support, past toleration
or knowledge of the harassment by others) the hostile environ-
ment ordinarily ends when the harasser is dismissed. It would
also end if the harasser inadvertently wandered into the women's
studies section of a book store, had a feminist epiphany, repented
his past conduct, and convinced the victim that he had changed.
But once a harasser shows a disposition to abuse, interruptions in
the abuse do not alter the environment, except where they some-
how demonstrate that the abuses are not likely to recur.273 Third,
a woman who knows that her boss gropes randomly selected
"' In Dey v Colt Construction & Development Co, 28 F3d 1446, 1450 (7th Cir 1994),
the alleged harasser had assertedly unzipped his pants while alone in an elevator with the
victim. The court noted that the incident "would no doubt be even more frightening to a
reasonable woman in Dey's position who, prior to that incident, had endured more than
two years of verbal harassment." Id at 1456. See also Van Steenburgh v Rival Co, 171 F3d
1155, 1159 (8th Cir 1999) (although perpetrator's "pattern of harassment involved waiting
several months between incidents," plaintiff was "in constant fear of retaliation [and] ...
so frightened that her job performance declined and she became clinically depressed");
Draper v Coeur Rochester, Inc, 147 F3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir 1998) (harassers' hostile act
indicated "all that could be expected in the future"); Hathaway v Runyon, 132 F3d 1214,
1217, 1222 (8th Cir 1997) (plaintiff "feared that [perpetrator] would fondle her again ...
and was terrified to pass within grabbing range"); Schwapp v Town of Avon, 118 F3d 106,
108 (2d Cir 1997) (high ranking official advised minority victim that he "should not ex-
pect" fellow white officers to treat him with the respect with which he treated them);
McKenzie v Illinois Dept of Transportation, 92 F3d 473, 477 (8th Cir 1996) (plaintiff
"scared to death' to be alone with [perpetrator]"); King v Hillen, 21 F3d 1572, 1574 (Fed
Cir 1994) (plaintiff "afraid to be alone" with perpetrator).
22 510 US at 21-22 ("[I]f the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to
be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employ-
ment.").
273 Bales v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 143 F3d 1103, 1009 (8th Cir 1998):
[Supervisor's] offensive actions abated only for short periods of time when
[plaintiff] would indicate that she was upset with him, and then they
would begin anew. To the extent the record shows the dates of the inci-
dents described, it would appear that the frequency of the troublesome
conduct waxed and waned and that there were times when Vallejo was
more restrained in his conduct than he was at other times. But there was
a clear pattern of offensive conversation and behavior.
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women is working in a hostile environment; she is entitled to sue
before she herself has been victimized.274
Thus in a typical hostile environment case, absent an ex-
traordinary situation like a sexual assault, what distinguishes an
"environment" from an "isolated incident" are circumstances that
demonstrate to the victim that the harasser has a disposition to
engage in abuse. A victim would ordinarily consider the number,
frequency, circumstances, and type of incidents in assessing the
risk of recurrence. A single off-color joke or unwanted request for
a date would not support such an inference, because such an ac-
tion might represent no more than an isolated error of judgment
from someone who ordinarily knew better. On the other hand, a
supervisor's unsolicited groping is a sure sign of trouble, because
it departs so markedly from normal social behavior.275
Reported cases illustrate a number of different reasons why
abusive behavior might recur. First, a harasser may adhere to a
view of women (or of a racial minority2 7 ) that would predispose
him to harassment.277 Second, some aspect of the harasser's char-
" Intentional discrimination directed at other individuals, including non-employees,
can create a hostile environment for an employee of the targeted group. See Meritor, 477
US at 66, quoting Rogers v EEOC, 454 F2d 234 (5th Cir 1971); Moyo v Gomez, 40 F3d 982,
986 (9th Cir 1994).
M The significance of the content of the action is illustrated by Webb v Cardiothoracic
Surgery Associates, 139 F3d 532 (5th Cir 1998). The first incident occurred at a bar during
a business trip, when the perpetrator, the victim's supervisor, hugged her and asked her
to come to his hotel room. Several weeks later, during a meeting in his office, the perpe-
trator allegedly "placed his hand on her leg and touched the inside of her thigh under her
skirt." Id at 535. The court of appeals observed:
Even if the [ ] incident at the bar and hotel .. .was insufficient to put
[plaintiff] on notice that her employment might be affected by [the perpe-
trator's] conduct, when the incident in [his] office occurred only weeks
later, [she] was on notice that [his] conduct would affect her employ-
ment .... The plaintiff needed no additional facts after these two encoun-
ters to understand that [her supervisor] was sexually harassing her.
Id at 538.
.70 See Schwapp, 118 F3d at 108 (high ranking official advised black officer to try to
understand the history of the department as "the history of an all white male department
and that at one time all the crimes in Avon were committed by blacks and that guys
started to stereotype people."); Harrison v Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 80 F3d
1107, 1118 (6th Cir 1996) (manager used racial epithets and other abuse to try to run the
plaintiff off the job).
27 See Smith v Norwest Financial Acceptance, Inc, 129 F3d 1408, 1414 (10th Cir
1997) (record showed "sexual and racial animus directed toward [pllaintiff"); Black, 104
F3d at 825 (harassers had "a grade school level fascination with women's body parts");
Crawford, 96 F3d at 832 (supervisor said, "I don't think women over 55 should be work-
ing," and "[o]ld people should be seen and not heard") (alteration in original); Aman, 85
F3d at 1078 (supervisor said possibly regarding African-Americans, "we're going to have to
come up there and get rid of all of you"); id at 1083 ("A reasonable jury could find that
statements like the ones allegedly made in this case send a clear message ... that mei-
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acter - perhaps a willingness to abuse supervisory power for
sexual gain - may dispose him to harassment.27 s Third, a har-
asser's strange or erratic behavior may give rise to a legitimate
concern that the harasser is somewhat out of control, and that he
may act unpredictably or inappropriately. 279 Fourth, the actions of
a spurned suitor or harasser may demonstrate that he has a dis-
position to retaliate against the victim. 20 Fifth, where a supervi-
sor has shown animus toward a victim because of her race or to
her gender, the victim will thereafter legitimately doubt the fair-
ness of or motives underlying every adverse decision made by
that supervisor.28 ' In some situations a perpetrator's known on-
going animus or demeaning view of the plaintiff may by itself
constitute a condition of the job that endures long after the par-
ticular incident or incidents which may have revealed that hos-
tility.2
82
The pervasiveness of harassment - both its regularity and
frequency - is important because it indicates to the victim that
bers of a particular race are disfavored."); Dey, 28 F3d at 1457 ("Don't talk to the broad -
girls are only good for one thing."); Stacks v Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc, 27 F3d
1316, 1318 (8th Cir 1998) (harasser had stated that "women in sales were the worst thing
that had happened to this company" and that "there isn't a woman alive that can make it
with Yellow Pages").
"' Phillips v Taco Bell Corp, 156 F3d 885, 887 (8th Cir 1998) ("[perpetrator] Dwayne
didn't get it"); McKenzie, 92 F3d at 477 (supervisor told victim that harasser was "simply a
barroom bully"); Steiner v Showboat Operating Co, 25 F3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir 1994) (per-
petrator remarked "I spoke the same way ever since I have been born").
Bales, 143 F3d at 1106-07 (when victim took a day off of work because of a "per-
sonal problem" with her then boyfriend, supervisor repeatedly called her at home and
threatened to fire her if she did not tell him the details; subsequently he told victim he
"was having conversations with her 'in his head,' repeatedly mentioned having dreams
about her, posed as her boyfriend to get photographs of her from a portrait studio, and
allegedly began stalking her); Gallagher v Delaney, 139 F3d 339, 343 (2d Cir 1998) (man-
ager told secretary that he had had a dream that she kissed him); Fuller v City of Oak-
land, 47 F3d 1522, 1527-28 (9th Cir 1995) (former paramour made repeated hang-up calls
to plaintiff, threatened to kill himself, attempted to run plaintiff off the road, and forced
her to give him her unlisted number); id at 1528 (plaintiff "no longer kn[e]w what to ex-
pect next from [harasser], and [could] reasonably be concerned that he might do anything
at any time"); Ellison v Brady, 924 F2d 872, 874 (9th Cir 1991) (after receiving disturbing
letter from harasser, victim "didn't know what he would do next").
' Saxton v American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 10 F3d 526, 529 (7th Cir 1993)
(after victim spurned supervisor's advances she "perceived a change in [his] attitude to-
ward her at work.... [H]e refused to speak with her, treated her in a condescending
manner, and.., seemed inaccessible.").
" See, for example, Rodgers v Western-Southern Life Ins Co, 12 F3d 668, 673 (7th Cir
1993) (use of racial epithets by supervisor "encouraged [plaintiff] to view even [supervi-
sor's] race-neutral decisions as racially-motivated efforts to force [plaintiff's] resignation").
' Id at 675 (six month period between supervisor's racist remark and victim's resig-
nation did not "sever the causal connection between the statement and the resignation").
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she remains at risk.2" Where abuse has happened on several oc-
casions, the victim may sensibly conclude that it is going to
recur;2 a second or subsequent act may tell the victim whether
the first incident was an isolated lapse of judgment or the result
of an underlying attitude. Furthermore, the timing of one or more
additional acts indicates the frequency with which recurrence is
likely to occur. Harassment need not be frequent to be foresee-
able: if a supervisor regularly groped his female subordinates
every Valentine's Day, that practice would be a condition of em-
ployment as surely as if it were a written policy. Infrequency un-
dermines a claim that harassment is a condition of employment
only when the period of time between recurrences is so great and
unpredictable that a reasonable victim could not be concerned
about repetition. Finally, prior harassment will color the impact
of a subsequent act. Later actions may be more harmful both be-
cause they confirm the likelihood of regular recurrences and be-
cause the victim may be more sensitive as a result of prior
abuses.285 Recurrence is often an important part of proving that
harassment was a condition, but the presence of that condition
should not be confused with the evidence that demonstrates its
existence. If a supervisor credibly announced that he would, be-
ginning on January 1 of the next year, grope a named subordi-
nate, groping would become a condition of his or her employment,
just as if the employer announced that it would at random inter-
vals dock the pay of workers of Spanish origin to revenge the
sinking of the Maine.
' See, for example, Hathaway, 132 F3d at 1222 ("A work environment is shaped by
the accumulation of abusive conduct."); Galloway v General Motors Service Parts Opera-
tions, 78 F3d 1164, 1166 (7th Cir 1996) (sexual harassment "is often a cumulative proc-
ess"); King, 21 F3d at 1581 ("[I]t is the cumulative effect of the offensive behavior that
creates the working environment").
' As the Fifth Circuit has correctly observed, once the harassment has occurred
enough that a recurrence is foreseeable, its irregularity is not fatal to a hostile environ-
ment claim. Butler v Ysleta Independent School District, 161 F3d 263, 269 (5th Cir 1998)
("[T]he allegedly discriminatory conduct - consisting of occasional [anonymous] letters -
was infrequent .... We do not place undue weight on this factor, however. Even occa-
sional anonymous letters can be frightening, and irregular receipt of such letters may be
even more disarming than letters that arrive like clockwork and become an expected nui-
sance for which the victim may be prepared.").
See Gallagher, 139 F3d at 347 (holding that acts committed prior to the sexual
harassment cause of action "possibly increase[ I" a victim's "sensitivities"). A number of
decisions confuse the greater harm caused by more frequent incidents with the require-
ment that the plaintiff show that harassment was a condition of the job. See, for example,
Hopkins v Baltimore Gas & Electric Co, 77 F3d 745, 753 (4th Cir 1996) (stating that in-
termittent acts of harassment over a seven year period "suggests the absence of a condi-
tion sufficiently pervasive to establish Title VII liability").
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Conversely, an isolated incident may be insignificant because
it is not sufficient to rule out the possibility that the perpetrator
was guilty of an atypical, momentary lapse in judgment, or was
engaged in a one time effort to learn whether the plaintiff shared
his interest in a personal relationship. Even if there is a signifi-
cant risk of recurrence, a victim may conclude that any recur-
rence is likely to be so infrequent and mild - one off-color joke at
the annual Christmas party, for example - that the problem will
not rise to the level of an ongoing concern.
This analysis makes clear the complexity of the fact-specific
judgment that a jury must ordinarily make in a hostile environ-
ment case. The trier of fact must assess what conclusions a victim
drew, and what conclusions she might reasonably have drawn,
regarding (a) the likelihood that the harasser would again engage
in misconduct, (b) how soon and how frequently that misconduct
was likely to occur, (c) how serious the misconduct was likely to
be, and (d) the combined significance of these first three factors.
Constant harassment, whether mild or severe, would alter the
conditions of employment because it would demonstrate that the
problem would recur quite regularly. Conversely, a single sexual
assault is sufficient because even a small risk of recurrence of
such abuse would create a hostile environment.286 In most cases,
however, the trier of fact must consider the combined effect of the
pervasiveness (as an indicator of the risk of recurrence) and se-
verity (as an indicator of the magnitude of likely harm).
The original Meritor formulation - whether the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of em-
ployment and create a hostile or abusive environment - is not
some complex legal test, but simply frames a common sense, fact-
specific question. It is the same sort of inquiry as "Was the
weather sufficiently hot or muggy to alter the conditions and
make the vacation uncomfortable." The Tenth Circuit grasped
the fact-specific nature of this issue when it observed:
[W]hile courts have tended to count events over time to
determine pervasiveness, the word "pervasive" is not a
counting measure. The trier of fact utilizes a broader con-
textual analysis. It begins with the number, sequence, and
timing of the conduct. The fact-finder then looks at the
See Brzonkala v Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 132 F3d 949, 959 (4th Cir 1997),
vacated on other grounds, 169 F3d 820 (4th Cir) (en banc), cert granted as United States v
Morrison, 120 S Ct 11 (1999).
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nuances of an environment that is imposed by each in-
stance of discriminatory behavior.287
Many lower courts however, in an effort to tease out of Meri-
tor a number of purely legal issues, have isolated the phrase "se-
vere or pervasive." They have turned the words "severe" and
"pervasive" (particularly the word "pervasive") into largely empty
vessels whose meanings the courts can fashion or manipulate at
will. This process has involved three distinct steps. First, the
phrase "severe or pervasive" is simply removed from the formula,
so that (like "hot or muggy" in isolation) its meaning no longer
turns on what it might show; instead it somehow refers to some
concept of severity and pervasiveness in the abstract. Second, the
"or" is often assumed to be rigidly disjunctive; thus there are en-
tirely separate and unrelated tests, one for "pervasiveness" and
one for "severity." Third, severity then largely drops from the
analysis. A harassment claim with no pervasiveness, but only
severity, would be a claim that could succeed even though there
was only a single incident. Courts have sensibly concluded that
only in very unusual cases could a single incident create a hostile
work environment; reported decisions to date have typically
found this present in a case of sexual assault or the use of the
word "nigger."" These assumptions lead to numerous opinions
that hold that pervasiveness, or some similar concept - not per-
vasiveness that causes a change in the environment but just per-
vasiveness in some abstract sense - is a distinct and essential
element of any hostile work environment case."9
Detached in this way from its original context in Meritor, the
legal standard of pervasiveness is understandably vague and
manipulable. Appellate decisions phrase this standard in a vari-
ety of ways. Some cases require that harassment be "regular,"
Smith, 129 F3d at 1415.
See, for example, Tomka v Seller Corp, 66 F3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir 1995) ("[Elven a
single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim's employ-
ment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability.");
Daniels v Essex Group, 937 F2d 1264, 1274 n 4 (7th Cir 1991) ("If a black worker's col-
leagues came to work wearing the white hoods and robes of the [Ku Klux] Klan and pro-
ceeded to hold a cross-burning on the premises, all with the knowledge of the employer,
this single incident would doubtless give rise to the employer's liability for racial harass-
ment under Title VII.").
' See, for example, Spain v Gallegos, 26 F3d 439, 447 (3d Cir 1994) (listing perva-
siveness as one of five requirements of a hostile work environment claim), citing Andrews
v Philadelphia, 895 F2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir 1990).
' Knabe v Boury Corp, 114 F3d 407, 410 (3d Cir 1997) (stating that harassment
must be "pervasive and regular") (emphasis added); Aman v Cort Furniture Rental Corp,
85 F3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir 1996) (same); Spain, 26 F3d at 447 (same).
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suggesting that the incidents must occur at a fairly consistent
pace with only modest separations in time. A second approach
demands proof that the harassment be "continuous,"" envision-
ing essentially incessant mistreatment. A third line of decisions
insists on a "steady barrage,"292 implying both that the number of
incidents must be large (a barrage not a salvo) and that they
must be more or less incessant. One Second Circuit case, for ex-
ample, demands that the acts of harassment "permeat[e]"293 the
workplace. Another Eighth Circuit decision insists on "a consis-
tent course" of harassment.29'
These varying formulations have several important common
characteristics. It does not matter what type of harassment is
involved, only that it occurs with the requisite consistency or in
the required volume. Because these formulations use some con-
cept of pervasiveness as a mechanical test, rather than as a tool
for deciding whether the harassment caused something, they are
well adapted to serving as a legal standard which judges rather
than juries would apply. To return to the weather analogy,
whether the weather was sufficiently hot and muggy to spoil a
vacation is the sort of factual inquiry appropriate for a jury, but
whether it was "hot" could be a matter to be resolved on summary
judgment, so long as a court is prepared to create some legal
standard - 70 degrees, 80 degrees, 212 degrees, etc. - to define
"hot."
Having converted the pervasiveness factor into this sort of
abstract legal standard, the courts have been free to manipulate
it to determine the outcome of cases. There is simply no intelligi-
" Perry v Ethan Allen, Inc, 115 F3d 143, 149 (2d Cir 1997) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); but see Hathaway, 132 F2d at 1222 (plaintiffs "exposure to
harassing conduct need not have been continuous in order to have been pervasive"); Smith
v Saint Louis University, 109 F3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir 1997) (plaintiff "need not be exposed
continually to the harassment to succeed on her claim").
Witt v Roadway Express, 136 F3d 1424, 1433 (10th Cir 1998) (racial discrimination
case), quoting Bolden v PRC Inc, 43 F3d 545, 551 (10th Cir 1994) (same); Schwapp, 118
F2d at 110; Aramburu v Boeing Co, 112 F3d 1398, 1410 (10th Cir 1997) (same); Gross v
Burggraf Construction Co, 53 F3d 1531, 1539 (10th Cir 1995), quoting Bolden, 43 F3d at
551; Bolden, 43 F3d at 551; but see Smith v Norwest Financial Acceptance, Inc, 129 F3d at
1414 ("In Bolden we held that only two overtly racial comments and one arguably racial
remark over the course of [ ] eight years of employment did not constitute pervasive con-
duct.").
Gallagher, 139 F3d at 347. Harris uses this term in one passage. 510 US at 21
(describing a workplace "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in-
silt") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Callanan v Runyon, 75 F3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir 1996); see also Mullins v Campbell
Soup Co, 1995 US App LEXIS 11918, *10 (9th Cir) (unpublished disposition) ("plaintiff
must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or generalized na-
ture").
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ble standard one could invoke to determine whether "regular" or
"continuous" or "steady barrage" means at least one incident a
day, a week, or a month. At best this depends on what one re-
gards as an out-of-the ordinary occurrence rate. One might de-
scribe one earthquake a month as "regular," but not one cloudy
day a month. In Black v Zaring Homes, Inc,295 Judge Kennedy
overturned a jury's finding of sexual harassment based on abu-
sive remarks that occurred every two weeks at a regularly sched-
uled departmental meeting.296 The next year in Abeita v Trans-
america Mailings, Inc,297 Judge Kennedy upheld a complaint al-
leging that essentially similar comments were "commonplace,"
"ongoing" and "continuing," and explained that the continuity
"establishes that the statements were more pervasive or wide-
spread than the ones made in Black."29 In Baskerville, the plain-
tiff proved that during her seven months of employment there
had been eight discrete incidents, as well as a recurring practice
of calling her "pretty girl."99 Judge Posner characterized all these
incidents as "infrequen[t]" and "a handful of comments spread
over months."00 In Bolden v PRC, Inc,3"1 the Tenth Circuit dis-
missed twenty incidents in eighteen months0 2 as only "a limited
basis of approximately one incident per month."0 3 In Cowan v
Prudential Insurance Co,304 Judge Manion found a lack of perva-
siveness because "derogatory name-calling ... occurred only on
Saturday mornings [and] the conversation among co-workers
about visits to the strip club was limited to about once a
month."0 5 Abuse occurring "only on Saturday mornings" would, of
course, be weekly, regular, and quite foreseeable. In Penry v Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank of Topeka,"6 the harasser had over a three
year period followed her "constantly" when she went on break,
needlessly touched the victim "on many occasions," and made half
M 104 F2d 822 (6th Cir 1997).
2m Id at 823-24.
159 F3d 246 (6th Cir 1998).
Id at 252.
50 F3d at 430.
Id at 431.
43 F3d 545 (10th Cir 1994).
Id at 549.
Id at 552. The Court of Appeals also was not convinced that this harassment was
racially motivated, and referred to the conduct as "general badgering." Id. See also Spra-
gue v Thorn Americas, Inc, 129 F3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir 1997) (dismissing five incidents
over sixteen months as "sporadic").
141 F3d 751 (7th Cir 1998).
Id at 758. See also McKenzie v Illinois Dept of Transportation, 92 F3d 473, 480 (7th
Cir 1996) (holding three incidents in three months to be insufficiently pervasive).
155 F3d 1257 (10th Cir 1998).
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a dozen offensive remarks.0 7 The court of appeals upheld sum-
mary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the inci-
dents were "too few and far between.8 08
Courts using this mechanical approach have concluded that
the occurrence of gaps in a pattern of harassment is fatal to a
claim of pervasiveness, even when the pattern was so well estab-
lished that harassment was obviously a "condition" of the job in
the sense envisioned by Harris. In DeAngelis v El Paso Municipal
Police Officers Association,"09 a jury had found that a hostile work
environment had been created by a series of anonymous misogy-
nistic articles that appeared in a police union newsletter. The
impact of those articles was indisputable. Each column was
printed in a newsletter circulated to 700 to 1000 officers. There
was, as the court of appeals conceded, an "uproar of many female
police officers at their appearance.""0 Representatives of the De-
partment testified that they "were embarrassed about and ex-
horted against" the columns. " The police chief responded by cir-
culating two memoranda throughout the entire department. The
leaders of the union wanted to require the author to disclose his
identity, but the union voted otherwise."2 On two occasions, pub-
lication of one of the articles led to acts of insubordination on the
part of officers under the plaintiffs command." Although the
series of articles was a cause celebre in the police department, the
court of appeals nonetheless concluded that the problem was not
"pervasive" because ten articles in thirty months represented just
"a few" incidents that were not sufficiently "frequent."'
'" Id at 1260-61.
Id at 1263. In Saxton v American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 10 F3d 526 (7th Cir
1993), the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor "singled her out for particularly harsh
treatment after she rebuffed his advances." Id at 529 n 4. Within a five month period, her
supervisor "refused to speak with her, treated her in a condescending manner, [ ] teased
her about her romantic interest in a co-worker," canceled several meetings he had sched-
uled with plaintiff, and seemed generally inaccessible. Id at 529. Nevertheless, the Court
of Appeals sustained summary judgment for the defendant, asserting quite inexplicably
that there was no evidence the conduct was "frequent." Id at 534. See also Howard v
Beech Aircraft Corp, 1995 US App LEXIS 14692, *6, *7 (10th Cir) (unpublished disposi-
tion) (remarks which were made "frequently" were not "frequent enough").
51 F3d 591 (5th Cir 1995).
0 Id at 595.
Id at 596.
31 Id at 592.
"' 51 F3d at 596.
"' Id at 597. See also Saxton, in which the court acknowledged that the perpetrator
had made the victim's "life at work subjectively unpleasant," 10 F3d at 535, but nonethe-
less held that the conduct was not sufficiently "frequent" or "pervasive" to support a Title
VII claim. Id at 534.
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In Hopkins v Baltimore Gas & Electric Co, 15 a same-sex har-
assment case, the perpetrator had, over the course of seven years,
allegedly directed repeated off color remarks or sexual proposi-
tions at plaintiff, including "frequently" following him into the
bathroom when he was there alone.31 The problem was obviously
one that the victim could reliably have expected to recur, but the
Court of Appeals deemed the events not pervasive because the
events had "occurred intermittently over a seven-year period,
with gaps between incidents as great as a year." 7
A related misapplication of Harris is illustrated by cases in
which the victim is for some period physically separated from the
harasser. A number of decisions hold that that separation "dissi-
pated" the hostile environment, and that when once again within
range of the perpetrator the victim must establish a harassment
claim anew with fresh evidence or repeated occurrences, much as
if the original harassment had not occurred."1 8 Absent other evi-
dence, however, the physical separation that obstructed the pat-
tern of harassment does nothing to alter the harasser's attitude
and, thus, the victim's legitimate fear about his actions. Such a
passage of time during which the victim was protected from har-
assment by separation from the perpetrator is irrelevant where
there is "nothing to suggest that the practices changed at all."319
Under a system where the frequency of incidents has a con-
trolling, almost mechanical consequence, courts can reach a de-
sired result by manipulating the manner in which incidents are
... 77 F3d 745 (4th Cir 1996).
316 Id at 747.
31 Id at 753.
38 See, for example, Konstantopoulos v Westvaco Corp, 112 F3d 710, 716 (3d Cir 1997)
(finding that a seven month "hiatus" allowed the "lingering effects of the prior [harassing]
conduct to dissipate"). In Morrison, 108 F3d at 439, the court held that, although a for-
merly laid off employee must prove anew that post-layoff harassment created a hostile
work environment, she could rely on pre-layoff harassment to prove the intent behind or
likely effect of post-layoff actions.
A related error occurred in Turner v Reynolds Ford, Inc, 1998 US App LEXIS 9552
(10th Cir) (unpublished disposition), in which the alleged harasser had allegedly beaten
and raped the plaintiff, and thereafter followed her around while at work and exchanged
harsh words with her there. Id at *3-5. The Court of Appeals deemed the assault and rape
legally irrelevant because it had not happened at the workplace, id at *15, and then found
the at-work events insufficient by themselves to establish a hostile environment. Id at *14.
Obviously such a victim would not shed at the office door the fear generated by a prior
assault and rape by a still hostile co-worker. The decision in Turner stands in stark con-
trast with Feltner v Title Search Co, 1998 US App LEXIS 21691, *9 (7th Cir) (unpublished
disposition) which held that a mere "indirect threat of rape" made outside of the office to a
third party would strongly support a hostile environment claim.
Stacks v Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc, 27 F3d 1316, 1327 n 5 (8th Cir
1994), quoting Baggett v Program Resources, Inc, 806 F2d 178, 182 (8th Cir 1986).
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counted, or disregarded. Judge Manion's decision in Cowan v
Prudential Insurance Co,32° is a tour de force of this technique.
Regular Saturday morning use of derogatory terms about women
was dismissed by the court because it occurred "only" one day a
week. Office discussions of visits to the local strip club did not
matter, the court of appeals insisted, because there was only one
such visit a month. A list of other specific incidents were rule ir-
relevant because they were unrelated to one another. The "ram-
pant" sexual joking and "frequent" discussions of exploits at the
strip club, referred to at page 756 of the opinion are never men-
tioned in the discussion of pervasiveness on page 758. And the
court simply could not see any evidence that the same supervisor
who must have either tolerated or taken part in these events
acted with any improper purpose when he generally refused to
talk with the plaintiff. In this fashion, the Seventh Circuit was
able to conclude that thirteen different types of incidents which
had evidently involved scores of occurrences simply were not nu-
merous enough.321 In Bolden v PRC Inc,32 the Tenth Circuit
minimized the significance of the fact that one harasser "often
used the term[ ].. . 'nigger"323 by emphasizing that perpetrator
had only used that particular epithet, not other types of racist
language, and stressing that there were "only" two harassers in
the case.324
In other circuits a similar frequency of incidents would be
entirely sufficient.325 The Fifth Circuit has placed sexual harass-
ment plaintiffs in a bizarre dilemma. On the one hand, it has re-
quired a large number of incidents to establish pervasiveness.
But it also dismissed a plaintiffs claim as untimely when she had
failed to complain after only two incidents: the court explained
that these two incidents should have put her on notice that she
was being harassed.32 A number of decisions hold that incidents
141 F3d 751 (7th Cir 1998).
See id at 756.
43 F3d 545 (10th Cir 1994).
Id at 546.
Id at 551 ("[Pllaintiff complains of only two overtly racial remarks (the Ku Klux
Klan comment and the use of the term 'nigger.')").
See, for example, Smith, 129 F3d at 1415 (holding that six incidents over twenty-
three months were sufficient to support a finding of pervasiveness); Schwapp, 118 F3d at
112 (holding that one incident every two months over a twenty-month period was suffi-
cient).
Webb, 139 F3d at 536-38.
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of verbal abuse cannot contribute to a showing of pervasiveness if
the victim cannot recall the details of the remarks.327
The Supreme Court in Meritor noted that an "isolated" inci-
dent would not ordinarily create a hostile environment. Where a
plaintiff proves that she was the victim of a series of abuses, a
number of lower court decisions still hold the abuse legally insuf-
ficient by ruling that each of the incidents was "isolated" from the
others. 28 Cowan minimized the significance of the circulation of a
sex-related cartoon, distribution of a photograph of one worker
with a stripper, and several other incidents on the ground that
they were "unrelated" to each other. 29 In Gross v Burggraf Con-
struction Co, 3 0 the harasser had exclaimed over the company ra-
dio about the plaintiff, "[S]ometimes don't you just want to smash
a woman in the face."33' The court dismissed the remark as "iso-
lated," meaning both that the court would not cumulate it with
any of the other alleged acts of harassment, and that it would not
consider the remark in determining whether other facially neu-
tral adverse actions or statements stemmed from hostility to
women.3 2 On the other hand, in the Federal Circuit, King v Hil-
len correctly stated that assessing each incident in isolation did
not give an accurate picture of the working environment.333
Although these attempts to fashion a legal standard out of
"severe or pervasive" has, perhaps predictably, been a failure, the
broad range of problems and circumstances portrayed in the re-
ported cases illuminate the intensely practical nature of the in-
quiry originally envisioned by Meritor. Because harassment can
create a discriminatory environment in so many different ways, it
seems unwise to attempt to create any uniform legal formula.
See, for example, Adler v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 144 F3d 664, 674 (10th Cir 1998)
(dismissing claim based in part on sexual comment, where victim "does not recall when
this incident occurred"); Hook v Ernst & Young, 28 F3d 366, 375, 369 (3d Cir 1994) (dis-
missing sex discrimination claim based on supervisor's alleged remarks, where plaintiff
admitted that she "was unable to recall the exact words, only the embarrassment it caused
her"); but see Dey, 28 F3d at 1456.
32 For example, in Black v Zaring Homes, Inc, 104 F3d 822 (6th Cir 1997), the plain-
tiff was subjected to a variety of obnoxious comments at the firm's regular bi-weekly
meetings, as well as a number of other abuses, all within a four month period. Id at 823-
24. In response to the plaintiff's assertion that during this same period she was the
subject of an inappropriate remark at an office dinner, the court dismissed that as a
"isolated incident." Id at 824 n 2.
141 F3d at 758.
53 F3d 1531 (10th Cir 1995).
Id at 1542.
Id at 1543.
21 F3d 1572, 1581 (Fed Cir 1994) ("[Bly viewing each incident in isolation, as if
nothing else occurred, a realistic picture of the work environment was not presented.").
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VI. "HOSTILE OR ABUSiVE" ENVIRONMENT
The core idea behind the Rabidue serious psychological in-
jury doctrine was that, even where acts of sexual harassment had
adversely altered a plaintiffs work environment, the alteration
would have to be unusually severe before it violated the law. The
Sixth Circuit decision in Rabidue actually required a plaintiff to
prove six different elements: (1) that the harassment had caused
her serious psychological injury, (2) that the harassment would
have caused serious psychological injury to a reasonable victim,
(3) that the harassment unreasonably interfered with her job per-
formance, (4) that the harassment would have interfered with the
job performance of a reasonable victim, (5) that she was actually
offended by the harassment, and (6) that she suffered some de-
gree of injury as a result.3" Manifestly it was likely that many
plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases would not be able to estab-
lish any of the first four elements. On the other hand, the Third
Circuit decision rejecting Rabidue framed what it believed to be
the correct standard, not in terms of the magnitude of its harm to
the plaintiff, but in terms of the resulting nature of the environ-
ment, insisting that Title VII would be violated by "an atmos-
phere of sexism."33 Although the Rabidue approach was particu-
larly extreme, the language of both Meritor and the EEOC
Guidelines on which it relied do pose a significant question: if
harassment has in fact altered the environment of a plaintiff,
what degree of alteration is sufficient to be "hostile" or "abusive"?
As did Meritor before it, Harris should have made clear that
Title VII forbade any significant alteration in working conditions
that is adverse to a protected group, not only those alterations
that reach some special level of adversity. Although Meritor at
times described the actionable environment as "abusive" or "hos-
tile," it also repeatedly used the term "offensive.""' In Harris,
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg expressly addressed this issue and
reached the same conclusion. Scalia asserted that the test was
"whether working conditions have been discriminatorily
altered,"337 while Ginsburg maintained that "[tihe critical is-
sue ... is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvan-
tageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of
Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co, 805 F2d 611,620, 622 (6th Cir 1986).
Andrews v City of Philadelphia, 895 F2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir 1990).
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 65, 66 (1986).
Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 25 (1993) (Scalia concurring).
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the other sex are not exposed." 8 In the 1998 decision in Oncale v
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc,339 Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, quoted this very passage from Justice Ginsburg's con-
curring opinion in Harris.3"
Despite the decision in Harris, the lower courts are sharply
divided about what type of alteration in the conditions of a plain-
tiffs employment is required to establish a Title VII violation.
Several Eighth Circuit cases expressly follow the Harris and On-
cale standard. Three Eighth Circuit cases specifically quote the
formulation of Justice Ginsburg that the altered employment
conditions created by the harassment need only be "disadvanta-
geous."341 Other decisions in the Eighth Circuit,342 like controlling
precedent in the Tenth,343 Eleventh,3" and Federal34 Circuits,
contain no requirement regarding the degree that the conditions
of employment must be changed, so long as the harassment alters
those conditions at all. Because any acts of harassment would,
virtually by definition, involve actions adverse to the plaintiff, the
alteration in employment conditions caused by any such harass-
ment would necessarily be adverse as well. Thus this line of deci-
sions is quite consistent with Harris and Oncale, albeit illustrat-
ing that the requirement in those cases that the alteration be
disadvantageous is somewhat superfluous. The Third Circuit re-
quires proof that the "discrimination would detrimentally affect a
reasonable person of the same sex in that position."348 In practice
this too seems the equivalent of the Harris-Oncale formulation,
since disadvantageous conditions of employment would have a
detrimental effect on a reasonable person.
Three circuits, on the other hand, follow the original Rabidue
approach, insisting that Title VII is violated not where harass-
Id (Ginsburg concurring).
523 US 75 (1998).
Id at 80.
Hathaway v Runyon, 132 F3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir 1997); Stacks v Southwestern
Bell Yellow Pages, Inc, 27 F3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir 1994); Kopp v Samaritan Health Sys-
tem, Inc, 13 F3d 264, 269 (8th Cir 1993).
" Bales v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 143 F3d 1103, 1106 (8th Cir 1998); Todd v Ortho
Biotech, Inc, 138 F3d 733, 736 (8th Cir 1998); Crist v Focus Homes, Inc, 122 F3d 1107,
1110 (8th Cir 1997); Callanan v Runyon, 75 F3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir 1996).
Aramburu v Boeing Co, 112 F3d 1398, 1410 (10th Cir 1997) (race discrimination
case); Bolden v PRC Inc, 43 F3d 545, 551 (10th Cir 1994) (same).
3" Mendoza v Borden, Inc, 158 F3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir 1998); Cross v Alabama, 49
F3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir 1995).
King v Hillen, 21 F3d 1572, 1583 (Fed Cir 1984).
Knabe v Boury Corp, 114 F3d 407, 410 (3d Cir 1997); Aman v Cort Furniture
Rental Corp, 85 F3d 1075, 1081 (3d Cir 1996); West v Philadelphia Electric Co, 45 F3d
744, 753 (3d Cir 1995); Spain v Gallegos, 26 F3d 439, 447 (3d Cir 1994).
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ment merely causes employment conditions that are worse for
women than for men, but only where those conditions are far, far
worse. The origins of this doctrine in the Seventh Circuit are
somewhat mystifying. Three 1994 Seventh Circuit decisions were
entirely consistent with Harris. The first decision, Dey v Colt
Construction & Development Co, 47 handed down by a panel which
happened to include the only woman then on the Seventh Circuit,
adopted the standard in Justice Scalia's statement in Harris. It
maintained that "[a]s Justice Scalia separately explained in Har-
ris, the test under Title VII 'is not whether work has been im-
paired, but whether working conditions have been discriminato-
rily altered.'3 4 s Subsequently, Judge Posner, in a decision joined
by the author of Dey, took the same position:
All [the plaintiff] need show is that her conditions of em-
ployment were adversely affected. If because she was a
woman [her employer] had turned down the heat at her
work station in order to make her uncomfortable, that
would be actionable sex discrimination, even if the discom-
fort inflicted was too mild to be described as "suffering."
Later in the same year, Doe v R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co,35 cited
Dey for the rule that the controlling standard was only "whether
the offensive acts alter the conditions of employment."351 Thus by
the end of 1994 not only was this doctrine clearly the law of the
circuit, but a majority of the active members of the circuit had
joined opinions expressly endorsing that view.352
Three months later a new Seventh Circuit panel decided
Baskerville v Culligan International Co.3"3 Disregarding without
explanation the last three Seventh Circuit decisions on this issue,
including his own opinion in Carr, Judge Posner insisted that
28 F3d 1446 (7th Cir 1994).
Id at 1454-55, quoting Harris, 510 US at 25 (Scalia concurring). The court went on
to state that "[tihe criterion is ... whether the offensive acts alter the conditions of em-
ployment." Id at 1455 (emphasis omitted), quoting King v Hillen, 21 F3d 1572 (Fed Cir
1994). Three years after Baskerville, a decision from a panel including Judges Rovner and
Diane Wood overturned an award of summary judgment for an employer, relying on a
series of incidents all but one of which would appear not to be cognizable under Basker-
ville. See Feltner v Title Search Co, 1998 US App LEXIS 21691, *8-10 (7th Cir) (unpub-
lished disposition).
Carr v Allison Gas Turbine Division, 32 F3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir 1994).
42 F3d 439 (7th Cir 1994).
Id at 444.
32 Judges Cummings, Flaum, Posner, Ripple, and Rovner joined in these opinions.
Judge Coffey dissented in Carr.
50 F3d 428 (7th Cir 1995).
336 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:
Title VII was not violated by harassment which created an ad-
verse or uncomfortable environment, but only by harassment
which resulted in truly horrific conditions: "The concept of sexual
harassment is designed to protect working women from the kind
of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for
women."354 The critical distinction, he explained was between "a
merely unpleasant working environment on the one hand and a
hostile or deeply repugnant one on the other." 5' Later decisions
in the Tenth, Seventh and Fourth circuits expressly apply the
Baskerville standard, holding that Title VII is not violated by
harassment or other discrimination which alters the conditions of
employment and creates an "unpleasant" environment, but only
by practices which bring about a "hellish" or "repugnant" envi-
ronment."'
Decisions following Baskerville use the facts of that decision
as a "yardstick," dismissing as legally insufficient complaints
whose facts seem less egregious than the allegations held inade-
quate in that case. This methodology has led to a certain amount
of manipulation. For example, in Baskerville, the Seventh Circuit
stressed that the harasser's purely verbal actions were not in any
way intimidating or threatening.357 Four years later in Hardin v
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc,35 the plaintiff alleged that the harasser
had slammed a door in her face, driven up behind her without
warning in an electric cart, and cut her off in a parking lot. 59 In
dismissing these allegations as legally insufficient, the Seventh
Id at 430.
Id at 431.
Penry v Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir 1998)
(noting that "[we have no doubt that the plaintiffs worked in an unpleasant environ-
ment," but holding that the workplace was not "permeated with discriminatory intimida-
tion"); Turner, 1998 US App LEXIS 9552 at *14 (finding harassment insufficient because
it was no worse than "unpleasant"); Hartsell v Duplex Products Inc, 123 F3d 766, 773 (4th
Cir 1997) ("[A]llowing [plaintiffs] claim to go to trial would countenance a federal cause of
action for mere unpleasantness."); Brill v Lante Corp, 119 F3d 1266, 1274 (7th Cir 1997);
Gleason v Mesirow Financial, Inc, 118 F3d 1134, 1145 (7th Cir 1997) (holding that "un-
pleasantness per se" is not a valid Title VII claim) (citation omitted); Koelsch v Beltone
Electronics Corp, 46 F3d 705, 708 (7th Cir 1995) (noting that atmosphere may have been
.unpleasant" but it was not "poisoned"); Saxton v American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 10
F3d 526, 535 (7th Cir 1993) (holding that although supervisor's "inaccessibility, conde-
scension, impatience, and teasing made [plaintift's] life at work subjectively unpleasant,"
summary judgment was appropriate because there was no evidence that the environment
was "hostile").
50 F3d at 430-31.
167 F3d 340 (7th Cir 1999).
Id at 343 (noting that the harasser "made no threats" and finding that "[i]t is a
little difficult to imagine a context that would render [supervisors] sallies threatening").
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Circuit insisted that Baskerville "involved more intimidating and
threatening actions."' °
In the Sixth Circuit, Black v Zaring Homes, Inc361 held that
the types of harassing conduct in that case were, by their very
nature, too mild to support a Title VII claim, however often they
might have occurred. But in Abeita v Transamerica Mailings,
Inc,6 2 the author of Black said the opposite, insisting that the
incidents in Black were indeed sufficiently serious, and that the
plaintiff in Black had lost only because the incidents were infre-
quent.
In addition, the Fourth," Fifth,3 ' and Sixth365 circuits also
insist that a sexual harassment plaintiff prove that the discrimi-
nation interfered with her job performance, even though in Har-
ris the Supreme Court expressly considered and rejected such a
requirement. The situation in the Sixth Circuit is particularly
surprising. Five years after Harris, where the Supreme Court
specifically disapproved of this aspect of the Rabidue rule, Sixth
Circuit opinions still quote or cite Rabidue for the very proposi-
tion that a plaintiff must show that harassment "had the effect of
unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's work
performance."M This continued reliance on Rabidue is not loose
talk or a judicial oversight: a majority of the active members of
the Sixth Circuit have joined at least one of these opinions.387
These decisions have specifically rejected sexual harassment
claims on the ground that the plaintiff had not shown the requi-
" Id at 346; but see Smith v Sheahan, 1999 US App LEXIS 20279, *11 (7th Cir)
(opinion of Diane Wood) (holding that a single incident of harassment, in which a male
supervisor inflicted serious bodily injury on a female employee, could support a claim
under Title VII).
3" 104 F3d 822 (6th Cir 1997).
159 F3d 246 (6th Cir 1998).
Hopkins, 77 F3d at 753-54 (holding that harassment must be "of the type that
would interfere with a reasonable person's work performance... to the extent required by




Rabidue, 805 F2d at 619. See also Peecook v Northwestern Natl Ins Group, 1998
US App LEXIS 18265, *8 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposition); Harrington v Boysuille of
Michigan, Inc, 1998 US App LEXIS 9796, *13 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposition); Logan v
Royal Oak Township Public Safety Dept, 1997 US App LEXIS 26507, *2-3 (6th Cir) (un-
published disposition); Barnes v Montgomery County Board of Education, 1997 US App
LEXIS 11539, *5 (6th Cir) (unpublished disposition); Fleenor v Hewitt Soap Co, 81 F3d 48,
49 (6th Cir 1996); Harrison v Metropolitan Govt of Nashville, 80 F3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir
1995).
37 Judges Batchelder, Boggs, Cole, Jones, Martin, Merritt, Moore, Nelson, Ryan,
Siler, and Suhrheinrich.
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site degree of job interference. In Harrison v Metropolitan Gov-
ernment of Nashville,3" a race harassment case, the constant
harassment was so serious that the plaintiff was diagnosed with
insomnia, was "under a great deal of stress," and often "couldn't
hardly think a lot during the day."69 The Sixth Circuit over-
turned the lower court's finding of actionable harassment because
"the plaintiff has failed to present evidence that his work per-
formance was affected by the racial hostility."
30
The Fourth Circuit requires "interfere[nce]" with job per-
formance;3 1 the Sixth Circuit demands somewhat more, "unrea-
sonabl[e]" interference." The Fifth Circuit goes even further, re-
quiring proof both that the harassment was "so severe and perva-
sive that it destroys a protected classmember's opportunity to
succeed in the workplace,"373 and that the abuse conveyed an ex-
plicit or covert "message that the plaintiff is incompetent because
of her sex." 74 The latter requirement is particularly limiting,
since most sexual harassment, even the rape alleged in Meritor,
is unlikely to convey any message about the victim's ability to do
her job. In Butler v Ysleta Independent School District 5 the
court held that a series of letters, some sexual in nature, sent to a
teacher by her principal, were not actionable because they did not
relate to her professional competence. In the court's view "a car-
toon suggesting that women are incapable of teaching on account
of their sex might undermine the ability of women to teach," but
ordinary pornography, sexually explicit remarks or unwanted
touching would not. 76
As the Tenth Circuit, the First Circuit, and a pre-Baskerville
decision in the Seventh Circuit have appropriately observed, 77
this requirement of interference with job performance is palpably
inconsistent with Harris (and now with Oncale). In Harris, the
defendant employer argued that a sexual harassment plaintiff
80 F3d 1107 (6th Cir 1996).
Id at 1118.
370 Id.
... Hopkins, 77 F3d at 753 (4th Cir 1996).
372 See note 366 and accompanying text.
... Shepherd v Comptroller of Public Accounts, 168 F3d 871, 874 (5th Cir 1999),
quoting Weller v Citation Oil & Gas Corp, 84 F3d 191, 194 (5th Cir 1996); see also DeAn-
gelis v El Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn, 51 F2d 591, 593 (5th Cir 1995).
171 Shepherd, 168 F3d at 974, quoting Butler v Ysleta Independent School Dist, 161
F3d 263, 270 (5th Cir 1998).
"' 161 F3d 263 (5th Cir 1998).
376 Id at 270.
177 See Davis v United States Postal Service, 142 F2d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir 1998);
Scarfo v Cabletron Systems, Inc, 54 F3d 931, 945-46 (1st Cir 1995); Dey, 28 F3d at 1455.
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must prove that the harassment interfered with her job perform-
ance."' The majority clearly rejected such a requirement, instead
indicating only that the presence or absence of such interference
would be relevant evidence.379 Justice Scalia observed that "the
test is not whether work has been impaired, but whether working
conditions have been discriminatorily altered."3 s° Indeed, the con-
tention that harassment is not illegal unless it interferes with job
performance - an interference which would either cause or at
least threaten economic injury - seems only a variant of the ar-
gument rejected in Meritor that a plaintiff must prove "tangible
loss" of an "economic character." 1
The practical significance of these requirements of hella-
ciousness or interference with job performance is highlighted by
the earlier proceedings in these cases. In a number of instances
the cases had gone to trial and juries had awarded compensatory
damages for injuries caused by the alleged harassment: $10,000
in DeAngelis,"82 $25,000 in Baskerville,"3 and over $150,000 in
Barnes.3" In none of these cases did the courts of appeals which
overturned the liability finding question the amount of the ver-
dict or suggest that the defendant had challenged it as
excessive.385 That fact, on reflection, is not really surprising. The
See Brief for Respondent, Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17 (1993), avail-
able at 1993 WL 757644, *27-28:
In hostile environment cases it is especially important to demonstrate
that conduct interferes with work performance. Requiring a plaintiff to
show a nexus between conduct and ability to perform the job is particu-
larly appropriate in cases such as this one .... [H]ostile environment
plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating some nexus between offensive
conduct and their ability to perform their jobs.
510 US at 23:
Whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only
by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threat-
ening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it un-
reasonably interferes with an employee's work performance .... [N]o sin-
gle factor is required.
(Emphasis added).
Id at 25 (Scalia concurring).
"' 477 US at 64.
51 F3d at 593.
50 F3d at 430.
1997 US App LEXIS 11539 at *4.
3M In Kimzey v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 107 F3d 568 (8th Cir 1997), it is clear from the
opinion that the defendant which unsuccessfully attacked the jury's finding of a hostile
work environment never challenged the size of the $35,000 compensatory award.
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decisions in these cases never questioned that the alleged har-
assment had occurred, and never suggested that such harass-
ment could not cause very real harm. They held, rather, that the
harassment was legal, which necessarily meant that the employ-
ers could with impunity ignore, encourage, or even order that
that harassment occur. Similarly, in Harrison, the district court's
finding of racial harassment was part of a contempt proceeding,
and the only remedy awarded for that violation was injunctive
relief.386 The effect of the Sixth Circuit decision, and the purpose
of this part of the employer's appeal, was to vacate a two-year old
injunction intended to protect the black plaintiff from racial epi-
thets and Ku Klux Klan incidents; in its wake the defendant's
manager was once again free to engage in such activity.
VII. "ACCEPTANCE" OF HARASSMENT AND
JOB-SPECIFIC EXEMPTIONS
In a passage quoted with express approval by Judge Krupan-
sky in Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co,387 Judge Newblatt indi-
cated that the requirements of Title VII would vary from job to
job. He emphasized that "in some work environments" lewd lan-
guage and explicit pictures may abound. Newblatt's insistence
that Title VII was not intended to change social mores suggested
that the law should not be construed to forbid such practices at
jobs where they were prevalent. Judge Krupansky offered a ra-
tionale for such an exemption from normal sexual harassment
prohibitions, arguing that courts should consider
the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of
the workplace both before and after the plaintiffs intro-
duction into its environs, coupled with the reasonable ex-
pectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that
environment.88
This would recognize a sort of assumption of risk exception to
Title VII, at least with regard to sexual harassment. Women who
voluntarily take jobs where they knew harassment is prevalent
could not complain that they reasonably expected better treat-
ment.
'80 F3d at 1112.
... 805 F2d 611 (6th Cir 1985).
Id at 620.
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These implications are not a mere slip of the judicial pen.
Judge Keith in his dissenting opinion pointed out quite precisely
the meaning of Krupansky's statements. The reference to women
"voluntarily" accepting employment with known harassers, he
objected, meant that women would waive any rights by taking
such jobs, and that those "work environments somehow have an
innate right to perpetuation."389 Keith pointedly asked whether
under the majority's interpretation of Title VII the statute would
also be inapplicable to other situations in which bigotry was open
and notorious. For example, he asked about the applicability of
Title VII to an employer that "maintains an anti-semitic
workforce and tolerates a workplace in which 'kike' jokes, dis-
plays of nazi literature and anti-Jewish conversation 'may
abound."3 "°
This job-specific exception to Title VII appears to have sur-
vived Harris only in the Tenth Circuit.391 In Gross v Burggraf
Construction Co, 392 the court established a separate standard for
assessing harassment claims in certain blue collar jobs:
In determining whether [plaintiff] has established a
viable Title VII claim, we must first examine her work en-
vironment. In the real world of construction work, profan-
ity and vulgarity are not perceived as hostile or abusive.
Indelicate forms of expression are accepted or endured as
normal human behavior.
Accordingly, we must evaluate [her] claim of gender
discrimination in the context of a blue collar environment
where crude language is commonly used by male and fe-
male employees. Speech that might be offensive or unac-
ceptable in a prep school faculty meeting, or on the floor of
Congress, is tolerated in other work environments.393
Two aspects of this passage are noteworthy. First, Judge Alarc6n
provides no explanation - and none readily comes to mind - of
Id at 626 (Keith dissenting).
Id.
3 Prior to Harris, the Tenth Circuit had seemingly endorsed the approach in Sauers
v Salt Lake County, 1 F3d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir 1993) (affirming judgment for defendant
where the district court found that employers' "unusually rough, sexually explicit, and raw
atmosphere" was "known and accepted or tolerated by all concerned personnel, male and
female alike").
53 F3d 1531 (10th Cir 1995).
Id at 1537-38.
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how he or Judge Anderson or Judge McWilliams would know
what types of vulgarity routinely characterized construction proj-
ects in Wyoming in 1989. If any of the judges had worked on such
projects in his youth, that would have been decades earlier, al-
most certainly not in Wyoming, 94 and assuredly before the time
when any significant number of women held such positions. Sec-
ond, as did the opinions in Rabidue, Judge Alarc6n does not actu-
ally find that all the women on such jobs are not bothered by such
conduct, but only that they "accep[t] or endur[e]" or "toleratfe]" it.
Subsequently, Smith v Norwest Financial Acceptance, Inc,895 de-
scribed Gross as holding that "the rough and tumble surround-
ings of the construction industry can make vulgarity and sexual
epithets common and reasonable conduct."396 There was undoubt-
edly a time when, in many parts of the country, the use of racial
epithets was common on construction sites. Neither Gross nor
Smith, however, offered an explanation of why Title VII should
prohibit racist remarks but not sexist remarks.
Somewhat inexplicably, between the decisions in Gross and
Smith a third Tenth Circuit panel took a different approach. In
Winsor v Hinckley Dodge, Inc,397 the plaintiff complained that her
supervisor had called her a "floor whore."398 The employer sought
to prove that this term was generally used by car dealers to refer
to female sales workers. The court deemed such usage legally ir-
relevant:
Testimony by defendant's former manager that "floor
whore" is an industry term does not negate its sexually
derogatory character. Just as we would not sanction an
industry term that is facially derogatory to a particular
racial or ethnic group, we cannot accept the argument that
industry use of an inherently sex-related term neutralizes
its detrimental effect on women. 99
The argument rejected in Winsor was narrower than the more
sweeping exception accepted in Gross, since it would have immu-
nized only a single phrase, not an entire industry. In Jenson v
Eveleth Taconite Co, 4°° the Eighth Circuit went even further than
The judges were from Los Angeles, Salt Lake City and Denver.
129 F3d 1408 (10th Cir 1997).
Id at 1414.
79 F3d 996 (10th Cir 1996).
Id at 998.
Id at 1001.
130 F3d 1287 (8th Cir 1997).
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Winsor, holding that the existence of the sort of widespread prac-
tice assumed by Gross to be common in the construction industry
actually underscored the culpability of an employer. 0 1
CONCLUSION
Noticeably absent from the five years of litigation after Har-
ris have been disputes about seemingly benign conduct which an
arguably oversensitive plaintiff or court sought to label as har-
assment. Although there has been an ongoing public debate about
the location of or ambiguity in the distinction between proper and
improper conduct, that controversy has no significant counterpart
in actual litigation. Supervisors and co-workers do struggle at
times to ascertain when a mildly racy joke might be out of
bounds, or whether asking out a colleague or subordinate would
be inappropriate; but, insofar as one can tell from reported ap-
pellate decisions, employers do not get sued over those fine dis-
tinctions. In the cases in which more conservative judges refused
to find a violation of Title VII, those judges often have gone out of
their way to criticize the underlying conduct complained of. Far
from generally suggesting that the alleged harassers were inno-
cents who were wrongfully attacked for a well-intentioned com-
pliment or for seeking romance in an artless manner, the courts
branded the culprits as crude, abusive, mean-spirited or misogy-
nists.
There is undeniably a wide range in the severity of the har-
assment that has been the subject of this lower court litigation,
just as there was an enormous difference between the alleged
rapes in Meritor and the off-color remarks in Harris. Judicial ef-
forts in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits to draw
some mechanical legal distinction between various levels of har-
assment have been palpably unsuccessful. The lower level har-
assment which these decisions seek to place outside the protec-
tions of Title VII undeniably caused real harm. None of the deci-
sions which overturned jury verdicts have suggested that the size
of the compensatory award was excessive, or that it had even
been challenged. Milder forms of harassment cause lesser inju-
ries, but the injuries are no less real. Under the Seventh Circuit's
"safe harbor" doctrine, the harassment found to have caused
• Id at 1292 ("We emphatically reject the Special Master's conclusion ... that the
fact that the culture of the Iron Range mining industry allowed sexual harassment is a
mitigating factor for [defendant].... Instead, we find this observation underscores the
overall culpability of [defendant].") (citation omitted).
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$25,000 in damages in Baskerville was entirely lawful under Title
VII. No member of that circuit, however, would conceivably rec-
ognize a safe harbor for $25,000 in salary discrimination, or even
$25, and justifiably so. There may be academics who might re-
gard a $25 difference in wages as far more serious than $25,000
in emotional injury, but over a decade ago Meritor forbade just
that sort of distinction.
In addition, at a point in the nation's history when the over-
whelming majority of federal judges are still men, and when ap-
pellate panels with a majority of women remain a statistical
anomaly, it is simply unseemly for the federal courts to be about
the business of announcing what types of abuse women find
"merely offensive" as opposed to "deeply offensive," or to be for-
mulating rules about what types of harassment women will just
have to put up with. Sexual harassment on the job is not just
about sex; it is about power, most often the power of a male supe-
rior, wielding an implicit threat to the livelihood of the non-
compliant, to compel a female subordinate to submit to verbal or
other abuse which he could not inflict on other women. Federal
judges blessed with life tenure often seem uniquely unable to un-
derstand the dynamics of such a situation, or to realize that a
remark which would be merely annoying from a stranger at a
singles bar could be far more demeaning and threatening from
one's boss.
The appropriate response of the legal system to less severe
forms of harassment should be the same as its response to less
severe physical assaults - lower damages. Judicial efforts to de-
lineate a safe harbor for lower level harassment seek to impose
an all-or-nothing rule to cases involving differences in degree;
damages, on the other hand, can be calibrated to take into ac-
count just those types of differences. Assessed from this perspec-
tive, juries have proven to be up to the task of making the needed
distinctions. In the leading Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuit
cases, the harassment was obviously less extreme than in Meri-
tor, but the awards were often appropriately modest - $50,000 in
Black, $25,000 in Baskerville, and only $10,000 in DeAngelis."2
There is, of course, no assurance that that will always be the
case; but the appropriate judicial response to the possibility of
large awards in mild cases is not to legalize the underlying con-
duct, but for district judges to use their authority to award new
trials where damages are grossly excessive. If a district judge
' See notes 382-84 and accompanying text.
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abuses that discretion by failing to order such a new trial, appel-
late courts have authority to intervene.4 °3
But that appellate authority is far different in kind from the
types of judicial intervention that have occurred since Harris, and
will restrict federal appellate judges to a decidedly more limited
and more appropriate role in sexual harassment cases.
' Gasperini v Center for Humanities, Inc, 518 US 415, 436 (1996).

